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ABSTRACT 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are popular means to potentially and 
immediately increase profitability of the firm today. Interestingly, the popularity 
of M&As does not seem to be affected by the fact that a surprisingly large part 
of the synergies expected from M&As are never fulfilled. Research has 
indicated a tendency among management to overlook the risks of value 
destruction after the deal is signed. In relation to this, the importance of 
considering factors affecting human actions and reactions has been 
emphasized.  
 
Current research in the business relationship and network fields has indicated 
that relationships have an influential role in the development of firms. The 
extent of previous relationship between the two parts has further been 
indicated to impact acquisition behaviour and its consequences. This, together 
with the importance of human factors in the M&A process, forms the platform 
from which our research departs. Hence, the purpose of this study is to explore 
the role of pre-M&A social relationships in the M&A process. In doing so we 
seek to deepen the current understanding of the processes and phenomena 
influencing the efficiency of M&A processes.  
 
Our findings are based on empirical data from four case studies and point to an 
important role of pre-M&A social relations in the M&A process. Firstly, during 
a pre-M&A relationship, soft synergies can be revealed and identified as they 
are put in practice. Hence, future potential can more accurately be evaluated in 
real-life situations before an M&A deal is signed, as such issues are difficult to 
predict from financial reports and balance sheets. Secondly, the social relations 
visualised opportunities for M&A for both selling and acquiring firms. Thirdly, 
it was also evident that the social relations partly contributed to open 
communication and a shortening of the first phase of the M&A process.  
 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, process view, value destruction, business 
networks, business relationships, pre-M&A relationships, social relations, social 
capital. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the reader with the research background as well as the main research 
problem. Purpose and contribution will also be outlined. Finally, the reader is also introduced 
to the biotechnology industry and the choice of this industry is justified. 
1.1 Research background 
Today, firms must constantly stay ahead of competitors to survive in the 
increasingly competitive and global market. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
are perceived in this challenge as a potential and immediate increase in 
profitability for the firm and have thus become popular. Almost every day you 
hear or read about companies involved in M&A activity. However, a 
surprisingly large part of the expected synergies are never fulfilled. Instead, 
market shares are diminishing, key personnel leave, and successful innovation is 
slowed down. It has been estimated that M&As fail in more than two out of 
three cases. Interestingly though, the popularity of M&As does not seem to be 
affected by this (Berggren et al 2003).  
 
Stemming from this is a large academic interest, aiming to understand the 
processes behind M&As and, as such, explaining the high failure rate. It is 
evident however that neither academics nor practitioners have yet achieved a 
thorough understanding of the aspects involved in planning and implementing 
a successful merger. 
 
Nevertheless, what research has indicated is, among other things, a tendency of 
management to overlook the risks of value destruction after the deal is signed. 
Instead, most time and effort is spent on search, screening, negotiations, and 
finally the closing of the agreement. Following this insight, much research has 
concentrated on the M&A integration process. Integration is when the two 
companies are to function together and create the expected value. In fact, the 
integration process has been argued to be the key to making M&As work 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). This is because value will not be created until 
capabilities are transferred and people from both organisations collaborate in 
order to create the expected benefits (Salama et al 2003). The integration is 
dependent on human processes and to achieve an atmosphere suitable for the 
transfer of strategic capabilities, it is vital that employees from both firms 
understand each other and really want to work together (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991). However, in many cases the opposite happens. Stress, tension, 
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and cultural clashes are common, threatening the long-term value creation and 
the competitive advantage of the firm (Buono and Bowditch 1989). 
 
Problems arising due to such “people issues” can be reduced by formulating 
and implementing an integration strategy aimed at winning trust, building 
commitment, and keeping employees focused on the job. Management 
commonly considers this first after the deal is signed. However, to be efficient, 
it should be part of the M&A strategy right from the beginning (Hutchison 
2002). Factors affecting human actions and reactions are important to consider 
if one wishes to further reveal and understand what is influencing the M&A 
process. 
 
Research conducted by Andersson, U et al (1997) has further indicated that the 
extent of previous business relationship between the two parts impact 
acquisition behaviour and its consequences. Their findings, together with the 
importance of human factors in the M&A process, form an interesting 
platform for future research. Most of the commonly occurring problems in the 
M&A process have social roots; it is hence likely that the solutions have social 
elements as well. We will depart from this platform when continuing the 
attempts to resolve some of the riddles of value creation and destruction in 
M&As.    
1.2 Focus chosen 
Before presenting our main research problem we will present the chosen focus. 
The current academic research in the business relationship and network fields 
has indicated influential roles for relationships in the development of firms. 
These relationships are likely to comprise many aspects (Johanson and Vahlne 
1977, Anderson 1994, Andersson 1997).  
 
However, in this argumentation we believe social aspects are missing. Further, 
the extensive evidence of “human-related” problems in the M&A process has 
led us to wonder if there could be a deeper social aspect in business 
relationships which could play an important role in the M&A process. Much of 
what has been recommended in literature to avoid “people-issues” points to the 
importance of social interaction. Logically, if the two firms have had a pre-
M&A business relationship, interaction is likely to have been a large part of it, 
in addition to factors considered in earlier research.  
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This study will continue on from current research, but will focus on the social 
aspects of the previous relationship.  
1.3 Research problem 
Following this reasoning our main research problem is:  
 
 
 
 
 
To enable an investigation of the above, an understanding of the M&A process 
itself is necessary. The following question will thus be answered theoretically: 
 
• What are the phases of the M&A process and where and why are problems likely to 
arise?  
 
Further, an understanding of what business relationships entail and how and 
why they are likely to play a role in the M&A process, is needed. Hence, 
following questions will also be theoretically answered:  
 
• What do business relationships entail?  
• What benefits and risks are business relationships likely to bring? How and why are 
they likely to influence the M&A process?  
 
Following this, the theoretical understanding will be confronted and, in turn, 
revised and complemented with an empirical study. With this, the main 
research problem will be answered. In the end, conclusions will be summarised 
in the form of propositions, which can be tested in future research. 
1.4  Purpose and Contribution 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore what role a pre-M&A relationship can 
potentially play in the M&A process. In doing this, we seek to deepen the 
current understanding of the processes and factors influencing the efficiency of 
M&A processes.  
 
To our knowledge, no empirical studies have been reported neither in business 
relationship research nor within the M&A literature, dealing in this way with 
the effect of pre-M&A relationships in the M&A process. M&As continue to 
What is the role of pre-M&A relationship in  
the M&A process? 
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be important strategies to reach new markets and improve market positions 
and knowledge. An understanding of how value is created, and also potentially 
destroyed, in the M&A process is thus vital for the long-term value creation in 
the firm. This thesis specifically provides management with an insight in the 
value of business relationships and how these can be utilised in the M&A 
process to enhance value creation. The thesis will thus be of interest to firms in 
the process of an M&A, for cooperating firms foreseeing a closer relationship 
in the future, as well as for companies anticipating M&A activity. 
 
The thesis will further contribute to research by highlighting the directions of 
possible future studies and provide theoretical contributions to the current 
literature. 
 
To further clarify how we have worked throughout the thesis writing and how 
this thesis is consequently built up, we next present the research model. 
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1.5 Research model 
 
 
 
Research Backround  M&As are increasingly common today, nevertheless more 
than two out of three fail. Business relationships have 
been shown to affect M&A behaviour. In what way does 
the pre-M&A relationship affect the process?    
Understanding the 
M&A process 
M&A literature is studied to form a picture of the reasons 
behind why so many M&As fail. Important goals and 
common problems will be highlighted.  
What do relationships 
entail? 
Business relationships are investigated to see what 
benefits and risks they are likely to bring.  
How and why could a 
pre-M&A relationship 
play a role? 
The two theoretical fields are combined. Our initial 
thought of how a pre-M&A relationship could influence 
the M&A process is presented.    
STAGE ONE: Reviewing literature
STAGE TWO: Empirical confrontation of initial understanding 
Qualitative Case Studies Three cases where the merging firms have had a previous 
relationship, as well as one case where merging firms have 
not cooperated previously are studied in depth.  
 
STAGE THREE: Analysis and model reformulation 
Analysis, Discussion and 
Conclusions 
Empirical findings will be analysed with reference to 
theoretical concepts and our initial understanding. 
Findings and the theoretical and practical implications are 
discussed. Propositions are put forward. 
What is the role of pre-M&A 
relationships in the M&A 
process? 
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1.6 The biotechnology industry 
1.6.1 Definition of biotechnology 
Broadly defined, biotechnology (Bt) is the manipulation of living organisms, or 
parts thereof, for the production of goods and services (Bartholomew, 1997). 
This definition has been narrowed down and now includes three different 
technologies of recombinant DNA, monoclonal antibodies, and protein 
engineering. These three technologies form the basis for a wide range of 
treatments, diagnostics, and research discovery techniques today as well as 
products developed within the areas of, for example, health care, crop 
production and protection, food processing, and waste management. Hence, 
firms that engage in the research, development, and commercialisation of such 
processes and products are active within the Bt industry (Liebeskind et al, 
1996).  
1.6.2 Initial assumptions of industry situation  
Cooperation is often seen as the key to success within the Bt industry in 
general. The Swedish Bt market has an especially unique and well-known 
tradition of formal, as well as informal, cooperation between leading 
universities and researchers and companies within the industry (Boklund 2003). 
Consequently, we started our thesis writing with the founding assumption that 
cooperation and collaboration is common between Swedish firms in the 
Swedish Bt industry and that this cooperation in a later stage may develop or 
lead to M&A activity between the firms. This led us to think that the Swedish 
Bt industry would be suitable for investigating the role of pre-M&A social 
relations in the M&A process. With these assumptions in mind, we mapped the 
M&A activity where Swedish Bt companies had been involved. It turned out 
that most M&A activity had occurred during the last two to three years. 
Further, to our surprise, most cases identified involved a foreign company, that 
is, most M&A were not between Swedish companies. The investigation also 
showed that only in a few cases had cooperation preceded the M&A. This is 
despite the fact that collaboration and cooperation were recognised to be 
important and common within this industry. At this stage, we started to 
question our initial assumptions about the industry and, after a deeper look into 
the competitive situation of the Swedish as well as the global Bt industry, we 
realised that our findings above reflect the current situation within the industry 
very well, which will be further explained below. 
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1.6.3 Competitive situation  
North America is by far the largest Bt market in the world (Johnzon 2002), 
even larger than Europe and Japan together. In Europe; Germany, UK, France, 
and Sweden are the largest markets with respect to the number of Bt 
companies. However, on a per capita basis, or relative to GDP, Sweden is 
actually the most Bt-intensive country in Europe (Boklund 2003). 
 
The global Bt market has undergone explosive growth in the past five years and 
the number of companies and marketed products has grown considerably. The 
industry is characterised by rapid technological innovation which constantly 
threatens to turn current products out of date as product life cycles become 
shorter and shorter. Bt firms are therefore constantly under pressure to 
innovate and bring forward new patents and valuable products. The strict 
property rights regimes within the industry further mean that competitors 
increasingly seek to take advantage of know-how that has not yet been 
patented. Bt firms therefore also need to protect themselves from 
appropriation (Liebeskind et al 1996). 
 
This hyper-competition means the supply of scientific knowledge is a critical 
aspect for a Bt firm’s survival. However, the intellectual resources available are 
immobile since the number of “star researchers” within Bt is relatively limited. 
Further, the rapid pace of innovation requires Bt companies to be flexible, thus 
minimizing sunk cost investments in the different lines of research. Hence, Bt 
firms are dependent on developing and being part of networks in order to 
source this valuable external knowledge (Liebeskind et al 1996). The 
competitive conditions within the industry have resulted in an increasing 
number of strategic alliances and close relationships with leading universities, 
researchers, and other Bt or pharmaceutical firms. Actually, alliances and 
collaboration are viewed as key components in the strategies of pharmaceutical 
and Bt companies (Brownlee 2003), and so will also be discussed further on in 
the literature review (see chapter 4). Having explained the competitive situation 
within the industry, we have also justified our choice of this industry for 
identifying suitable cases for this thesis.  
1.6.4 Industry consolidation  
The Bt industry is going through a consolidation phase. During 2001, the big 
pharmaceutical companies faced declining revenues and an increased pressure 
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for new products, especially since several important patents expired in 2002. As 
a consequence, Bt innovation is an important source of new product 
technologies for traditional pharmaceutical companies. Hence, Bt has now 
achieved a market strength, which is growing compared to that of traditional 
pharmaceuticals. The big pharmaceutical companies are trying to solve their 
problems and access new products through strategic partnerships, as discussed 
above, or via acquisitions of smaller Bt companies (Global Perspectives on 
Bioscience 2002).  
 
Consolidation is not only seen between pharmaceutical and Bt companies but 
also more and more between Bt companies. The main reason is the serious lack 
of funding within the industry. This is not just seen in Sweden, but also in other 
parts of Europe and the USA. Advances over the last 20 years have been 
possible in Bt only due to the large amount of investment in this sector. 
However, the investment climate and availability of funding looks different 
today compared to the last part of the 1990’s. Hence, investors will and are 
indeed demanding Bt companies to merge to achieve the “critical mass”. 
Consequently, consolidation might be the only way to gain access to future 
financing, liquidity, and survival in a global perspective (Champsi 1998, 
Johnzon 2002, Espander and Urdmark 2003). 
 
Even though it seems like lack of finance is the sole reason behind the 
consolidation observed, there might be other explanations as well. A potential 
reason could be, for example, that it in itself further drives the trend; when 
firms or individuals are unsure of the environment, they tend to do as other 
people do. They become caught up in the “general direction and behavioural 
mode” of the industry. This merger-mania is also affected by media. Political, 
personal, and legitimating actions are other potential drivers (Haunschild 1997).  
 
The consolidation trend described above is so far mostly noticeable in the USA 
however (Belusa and Andersson 2003). The same development is expected in 
Europe and Sweden, but has just started, as indicated by our initial findings. In 
fact, Sweden is about ten years behind the USA in this respect. At present, the 
Swedish Bt market is instead characterised by a number of small young 
companies that originate in the two giants, Astra and Pharmacia. Very few 
Swedish Bt companies have the resources and capital to acquire other firms 
INTRODUCTION 
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(Hedman 2003). Instead, foreign firms step in, and so the current Swedish Bt 
M&A activity spotted by us, in many cases, involved foreign firms. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter guides the reader through our work and thought process of writing and 
conducting the thesis. The set up and preparation of the study, as well as our choices regarding 
research strategy, method, and approach are presented and justified. Further, important 
aspects of selecting case companies, the analysis and quality of the research are discussed. 
2.1 The research process 
As explained in the introduction, we believe it is time to combine two major 
fields of research within the area of business studies. A literature review was 
therefore conducted, covering M&As and business relationships. From this we 
formed our initial understanding of the M&A process but also of what business 
relationships entail. This, in turn, enabled us to create our own theoretical 
understanding of what prospective roles a pre-M&A relationship could play in 
the M&A process. Next, this theoretical understanding was confronted by an 
empirical study. The analysis and reflections over the results led us to formulate 
propositions, on which future studies may continue.  
 
To do the empirical study, a map of M&A activity within the Swedish-based Bt 
industry (involving Swedish firms) was constructed. This was done by searching 
in relevant magazines, newspapers, databases, and the internet. We also 
contacted a number of knowledgeable persons, consultants, and organisations 
such as Uppsvenska Handelskammaren, Näringslivsenheten in Uppsala, 
Business Region Göteborg, and Medicon Valley. When the search continuously 
resulted in the same cases we considered it complete. The result was 22 
potential cases. From these, Bt M&As where companies had previously 
cooperated, and Bt M&As without such pre-M&A cooperation, were identified. 
Being close to an end of the investigation of the Swedish Bt industry, we had to 
change our initial assumptions about the status and cooperative situation. To 
strengthen our arguments and gain a further understanding of our results, we 
conducted two telephone interviews with people working with Bt clusters as 
well as with two people working in such clusters. Even though very interesting, 
we had to leave this subject at this point, as it was not the focus of this thesis.  
The dynamics of the industry chosen made it more difficult to reach and get 
companies to participate than first appreciated. An illustrative example of this is 
when we spoke to the CEO of Pyrosequencing while he was running to a 
business meeting. The next day he was on the front page of Dagens Industri in 
an article about the acquisition he had made the day before.  
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Nonetheless, three case companies from the Bt industry (two with a previous 
relationship and one without) were selected and willing to participate in the 
study. In addition, a fourth case from another industry (engineering) was added. 
If findings across industries in this case turned out similar, it would increase the 
validity of the study.  
 
Confronting our initial understanding with the cases, reality showed a 
somewhat different picture, as compared to our initial understanding. 
Accordingly, our theoretical understanding was refined, which is reflected in 
the analysis, discussion, and the final propositions.  
 
Figure 1: The thesis process  
    
 
Source: Adapted from methodology course, GBS:IB (2003)  
 
As illustrated above in figure 1, the thesis process started in theory, we 
confronted the understanding with empirical findings and finally concluded at 
the theoretical level. However, a constant move between theory and reality 
always occurs. It is also important to point out that the initial literature review, 
and our thoughts and understanding of the problem were not guided or 
influenced by case companies and their conditions, as these at that time had not 
been selected.  
2.1.1 Literature review  
Yin (1989) emphasises the importance of not reviewing literature to determine 
the answers about what is known on a topic. Instead, the aim should be to 
develop sharper and more insightful questions about the topic. This is achieved 
in this thesis with the creation of our theoretical understanding, the subsequent 
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confrontation, and finally reflection over analysis and theoretical concepts. By 
combining two research areas in this way, it is our belief that we have not only 
presented existing research and theory within the areas, but also reflected over 
it and created our own understanding. The literature review also provided a 
robust foundation and framework from which to confront this understanding. 
2.2 The choice of a case study strategy 
The main research question is“What is the role of a pre-M&A relationship in the 
M&A process”. To answer the questions, how and why must also be asked, 
which makes the question explanatory. The former formulation avoids such 
dilemma. We found the case study to be the best-suited strategy for our study, 
especially since it involved rather complex phenomena such as finding out 
about social factors, human feelings, and perceptions. Further, we needed to 
trace the respondent’s perceptions of what had happened in the previous 
relationship as well as in the M&A process, which is a development over time. 
All these aspects are hard to capture without in-depth interviews. We are thus 
in line with Yin’s (1989) view that case studies should be used when the 
phenomenon to be studied is contemporary, does not require control over 
behaviour, and answers the questions how and why. Following the above 
arguments, the research method chosen is qualitative. This gives us the much 
needed opportunity to get close to what is being investigated and really 
understand the people’s and the organisation’s situation. Holme et al (1997) also 
recommend this method with this kind of study.  
2.2.1 Selecting cases 
A distinction can be made between multiple and single case studies as well as 
between holistic and embedded case studies (Yin 1989). This study is regarded 
as embedded. We pay attention to whole organisations, but in trying to answer 
the main research problem, individuals within them naturally also have to be 
considered. Further, our study should be seen as a prelude to further studies 
within the area. It could thus be based on a single case study. However, several 
aspects made us believe that a multiple case study would benefit the final result. 
As mentioned, the dynamics and fast movement of the Bt industry meant we 
could not fully cover the concerns of a single case study (Yin, 1989). Our 
investigation of the Bt industry also contributed to the belief that a single case 
study might turn out to be misrepresentative. Therefore in order to get as deep 
an insight as possible into the area of investigation we chose multiple case 
studies.  
METHODOLOGY 
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The following criteria for cases to be considered as candidates were set up:  
 
1. M&As with and without previous relationship. This condition was set up to 
enable a comparative analysis.  
2. Integration should have occurred to some degree. A large part of the investigation 
aims to analyse the influence of a pre-M&A relationship on the M&A 
process. The integration is seen as an important part of this.  
3. Time restriction. The M&A should preferably be completed, but not too long 
ago. If time span is too long, facts, information, feelings, and other aspects 
are easily forgotten. Similarly, involved individuals might not be with the 
firm any longer. 
 
We managed to fulfil all these criteria with the cases included in the study. 
However, it should be pointed out that in the International corp.-Bioteknik AB 
case the integration of the two firms is not completed. Further, the Abigo-
DHC and Active-Nedermann cases occurred in the 1980-90’s. However, this 
has not appeared to be a problem. In the Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan case there are 
currently very low levels of integration, however higher levels were earlier 
attempted.   
 
Further, two cases involved foreign companies. However, this just added an 
interesting angle to the problem investigated. It could be that different national 
cultures will make the M&A process more difficult, hence potentially making a 
pre-M&A relationship even more influential.  
2.2.2 Choice of respondents 
At the outset of our thesis writing, we found it important to not focus the 
interviews on top management only, since much of the success or failure of the 
integration of the two companies actually lies in how the employees are coping 
with the situation. Hence, our intention was to interview managers, integration-
coordinators or “key-employees” as well as other employees involved in or 
affected by the pre-M&A relationship and the M&A process. Further, we 
wished to interview persons at both the acquired and the acquiring firm in 
order to get as balanced a picture as possible.  
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Regarding our choice of respondents, it should be noted that in some cases we 
were limited by the time and persons available to us. We were especially limited 
in that we unfortunately did not get to see as many employees as we had wished 
for. However, due to the nature of the relationships, we do not believe this has 
affected the final result to a large extent. 
 
Table 1: Participants from Abigo-DHC  
Name Current Position Involvement 
Jan Smith CEO, Abigo’s owner Involved before and after. 
Leif Smith  CEO, Abigo’s owner Involved before and after. 
Annegrethe 
Andersen 
DHC Marketing manager, sales assistant 
during previous relationship.  
Involved before and after. 
Lars Kirkeby Responsible for bookkeeping, purchasing, 
stock and invoicing at DHC. 
Involved before and after. 
 
In the Abigo-DHC case we met everyone from both firms who were involved 
in both the previous relationship and still work at either firm.  
 
Table 2: Participants from International corp.-Bioteknik AB   
Name Position Involvement 
Anna   CEO, Bioteknik AB   Not involved in the earlier relationship. Overall responsible 
for Bioteknik AB and integration from their side.  
Bertil  Division manager; 
biologics, 
International corp.  
Practically the only person from International corp.  
involved in the earlier relationship.  
Denise   R&D and Production 
manager, Bioteknik 
AB   
Bioteknik AB ’s first employee. One of a few involved in the 
earlier relationship. Responsible for integration of R&D.  
Clara  Quality controller, 
Bioteknik AB  
Neither involved in previous relationship nor responsible.  
 
Since the motive behind International corp’s acquisition of Bioteknik AB was 
mainly to acquire their biologics department, which is the same as Bioteknik 
AB’s R&D department, we feel that we got to interview relevant people. In 
addition, we also got to see one employee, who was not involved in the pre-
M&A relationship or part of any integration team. Nevertheless she gave us 
interesting insights into the general employee situation before and after the 
acquisition. 
 
Table 3: Participants from Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan  
Name  Current Position Involvement 
METHODOLOGY 
 16
Lennart Molvin Business development manager, WS Responsible for M&A. 
Totte Malmström CEO, Bioglan Responsible for M&A. 
In the Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan case we met two of the managers involved in, 
and mainly responsible for, the acquisition. No previous relationship existed in 
this case.  
 
Table 4: Participants from Active-Nederman  
Name  Position at time of acquisition Involvement 
Lennart Molvin Consultant at Active  Involved before and after. 
Acke Nyberg Marketing director Nederman Involved before and after. 
Lars-Erik Andersson  CEO of Nederman Involved before and after. 
 
Lennart was interviewed about the Wilh.Sonesson-Nederman acquisition as 
well, since he was also in this case one of the most relevant persons to talk to. 
From Nederman, relevant and available persons with good knowledge about 
the relationship between the companies before the acquisition and also about 
what happened after were interviewed.  
 
Subjects interviewed about the Swedish Bt industry, its structure, cooperative 
nature, and future development were the following:  
 
Table 5: Subjects interviewed regarding Swedish Bt industry and clusters 
Name  Position  
Christer Hedman  Project leader for “Medicinsk framtid i väst”, at Business Region 
Göteborg   
Kent Olsson MD Sahlgrenska Science Park 
Denise  Works in Medicon Valley 
Totte Malmström Works in Lund Science park  
2.3 Preparing interviews to investigate "soft" issues 
A potentially complicating factor is that this thesis deals with issues that are 
somewhat hard to measure or investigate; how does one go about investigating 
the role of a relationship in a M&A process? What is a relationship and what 
does it entail? Much involves subjective feelings and experiences, rather than 
quantifiable measures. These problems are commonly occurring in social 
science and we, as others, can only find the best-suited method or combination 
of methods, as there is no perfect method. This further motivates the choice of 
multiple qualitative case studies. 
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It was our belief that semi-structured in-depth interviews best suited the 
problem at hand and that they would provide as a rich picture of the reality as 
possible. Questions used were open, but nonetheless aimed at getting detailed 
and focused information. Questions avoided imposing our thoughts and 
theoretical concepts on subjects; instead we tried to ask around important areas 
and aspects. Similarly, we did not narrow interviews too much. We still wished 
to be able to capture interesting angles and questions.  
 
Before using the interview guide in the real interviews, we carefully tested it on 
two pilot respondents. Judging from the answers, we are confident that we 
have been able to capture the roles of the pre-M&A relationship to a 
satisfactory level, if there were any. Therefore, we believe our interview guide 
provided empirical data of the expected quality. For further details please see 
Appendix A. 
2.3.1 The interview situation 
When conducting the interviews we strived to achieve a casual and normal 
atmosphere. This is why in some instances we avoided using a tape recorder. 
We conducted the interviews in conference rooms, offices, in subject’s homes, 
and in restaurants. There were no disturbances in the form of other employees 
or people in any instances. In this way, we hope we did not sway the 
respondents’ answers in any way. Instead, in line with what is recommended by 
Holme et al (1997), we wanted the respondents to express their views based on 
their own perceptions and we therefore let the respondents lead the direction 
of the conversation as much as possible. Even though we had an interview 
guide when conducting the interviews, we tried to be open to new insights or 
directions.  
 
Directly after each interview, we individually interpreted the results and then 
compared and discussed its meanings before presenting it in the empirical part 
of the thesis. Where missing pieces of information were found, where we were 
unsure of what the subject meant, and, importantly, where interesting new 
angles were detected complementary interviews were conducted via phone or 
e-mail. Additionally, cases were sent to participants when finished. This gave 
them the opportunity to check facts, details, and interpretations and they could 
clarify their answers. We argue that this has strengthened the quality of the 
thesis.  
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2.4 Reflections regarding the quality of the research 
2.4.1 Methodological limitations 
A potential problem with the interviews was that the issues under investigation 
were sometimes hard to communicate and experienced as “blurry” by subjects. 
It can then be hard for subjects to fully understand questions and they might 
not feel the issues are important. This may have biased the answers. On the 
other hand, these issues can also be hard for the interviewer to explain 
objectively without emphasising specific issues, which in turn might bias the 
subjects. These problems can be overcome by longitudinal studies or 
observational studies, where researchers can “shadow” the organisation and 
processes of interest. This is a very good approach in sociological and 
organisational studies where human behaviour, actions, reactions, and emotions 
are studied (Holme et al 1997). This is very time consuming and not appropriate 
in this study however. 
 
Conducting research is almost impossible without being biased. This can be a 
result of the focus chosen and subjectivity can never completely be eliminated. 
Thus, you tend to find what you look for. This is shown to some extent in this 
thesis as the weight given to social influences. Other aspects of business 
relationships have nonetheless been considered, especially during the empirical 
study when we tried to keep an open mind. However, social capital and social 
factors are the aspects of business relationships we have chosen to focus upon. 
We have worked continuously throughout the research to limit the bias effects, 
and have never argued that social capital and social factors alone are important. 
The relationship in its totality, as well as a wealth of other factors and 
circumstances, also influence the M&A process and should not be forgotten. 
However, in order to conduct an in-depth study, focus and delimitations are 
necessary.    
 
Another potential bias of this thesis is the access to subjects to interview in 
both firms to interview. Even though we have tried hard to understand both 
sides of the relation, we nevertheless are aware that in some cases one side has 
been emphasised. This could have also coloured our findings. Finally, two cases 
investigated events that occurred more than ten years ago. The facts and details 
remembered are thus likely to be coloured by time, as it might be easier to 
remember the good things.  
METHODOLOGY 
 19
2.4.2 Validity 
As we have explained the M&A process and what a business relationship 
entails, we feel we have strengthened the construct validity of the thesis. In this 
way the reader is able to judge whether we have collected evidence that reflects 
these statements (Yin 1989). We have further strengthened construct validity 
through using multiple sources of evidence, as we were able to make direct 
observations at the offices and use secondary sources of information in 
addition to the interviews.  
 
External validity has to do with whether a study’s findings can be generalised 
beyond the immediate case study. This should not be confused with 
quantitative studies, which are statistically generalisable. Instead, qualitative 
studies can rely upon analytical generalisation (Yin 1989). The external validity 
is strengthened in this thesis through the use of multiple case studies, 
specifically, it is strengthened by the inclusion of an “outside” case from 
another industry. 
2.4.3 Reliability 
Judging reliability involves evaluating whether the same conclusions would be 
drawn if another researcher conducted everything we have done, in the same 
way, and investigated the same cases. As seen, we have therefore thoroughly 
documented our research process, including subjects interviewed, in order to 
strengthen the reliability of this thesis.  
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3 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
Chapter three provides a general picture of the M&A process and defines the concepts within 
the field. The literature review then examines both the pre- and post-agreement phases of the 
M&A process.   
3.1 The M&A concept 
As highlighted, Bt firms must constantly stay ahead of competitors to survive 
today’s increasingly competitive and global market environment. M&As have 
become a common occurrence in the strategic change process to cope with 
these challenges, however motives are still diverse (such as market expansion or 
tapping into knowledge, see below).  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are often referred to as one concept, “M&As”, even 
though they are two separate occurrences. A merger can be defined as “a 
statutory combination of two (or more) corporations, either by the transfer of all assets to one 
surviving corporation or by the joining together of the firms into a single new enterprise”. An 
acquisition is “when one firm buys enough shares to gain control over another” (Gertsen et 
al 1998 in Schweizer lecture 2003). The differences are that in a merger the 
parts are equally powerful and the agreement is cooperative, while in an 
acquisition one part dominates the other. However, if the firm for sale has 
many interested buyers and the power to decide whom to be acquired by, the 
power balance can be more equal also in an acquisition, making it more like a 
merger. As the process issues and problems in making the new organisation 
functional are similar in both mergers and acquisitions, they are treated as one 
concept in the literature. In fact, problems are common and even though 
M&As are frequent, two out of three fail (Berggren et al 2003). This suggests 
that neither academics nor practitioners have a thorough understanding yet of 
the variables involved in planning and implementing a successful merger. This 
is also the foundation for our interest in these processes. The literature review 
below summarises the current academic understanding of the M&A processes 
and reasons behind the high failure rate.  
3.2 The process view 
Traditionally, the M&A process was seen as a process directed and driven by 
economic analysis and rational decision making. Today, however, researchers 
are suggesting other explanations and look at the processes in the firm from 
other perspectives. Within the M&A literature, one such perspective is the 
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process view. This view emphasises that instead of analysing just the 
environment, motive, and strategic fit between the two firms, the M&A process 
in itself has to be analysed and considered, as this is tremendously influential 
for value creation. It can be seen as a shift from looking at the result to instead 
regarding the drivers of the result (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). This also 
justifies why we have chosen to focus on the process itself and not the 
outcome, as a more successful outcome inevitably goes via a successful and 
smooth process. It might however be possible to reach an initial positive 
outcome without a successful process – but it is our belief that for an optimal 
result and long-term value, a smooth process is necessary.  
 
A merger, or acquisition, is not just a decision to buy another firm or merge 
two firms, it is a long process which could in fact take years to complete. It is 
the actions and activities that this decision or deal initiates that actually is the 
M&A and also the goal of the deal. The traditional view points a lot of 
attention to pre-M&A analysis of strategic fit, financial valuation, and price but 
forgets the organisational and human issues involved (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991). Further, circumstances and conditions constantly change and human 
related issues cannot always be predicted, therefore synergies cannot be 
estimated until actually put in practise. This has become apparent not least by 
the high failure rate of M&As, as surely they were all initiated with the aim and 
estimation that the deal would create value, not the opposite.    
 
In accordance with the process view, we can then divide the M&A process into 
two major stages, before and after the deal is signed. The phases and stages 
within them interact and influence the outcome of each other, see figure 2. A 
lot of research has reasoned for this perspective where, for example, one study 
looked at how the negotiation phase of the M&A process affected the post-
integration management turnover. The study found that negotiations indeed 
affect the turnover, and the peak of top management lost came four years after 
the M&A negotiations were closed (Walsh 1989).  
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Figure 2: The M&A Process 
    
 
Source: Figure adapted from Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) figure 1-1, p12.    
3.3 Need, idea, and motive; before the deal is signed 
M&As are perceived as an appealing way to potentially and immediately 
increase profitability of the firm. M&As could also be the solution to a need for 
specific knowledge, technology, or any other factor within the firm. M&As can 
quickly extend the market, product portfolio, and knowledge of the firm. 
M&As are used to create and exploit synergies, to achieve critical mass, to gain 
foothold in other countries, to protect markets by eliminating rivals or 
contribute to the efficiency of the business (Schweizer 2003).  
 
Once the idea or need for M&A has been identified, the firm must screen and 
search for a suitable partner. Further, before entering negotiations, the strategic 
and organisational fit between the firm and the potential partner must be 
considered and analysed (Jemison and Sitkin 1986). However, contradicting  
Jemison and Sitkin (1986), we think this should be done not because the two 
parts must be similar for success to be achieved but rather because the 
similarities and differences must be considered so that a suitable integration 
strategy can be applied. All this has to be analysed while simultaneously 
considering how it will affect the acquisition process and also how the 
acquisition process in turn will affect the strategic and organisational fit as well 
as the negotiation and all other processes. Thus, before signing the agreement 
all factors that can potentially affect the value creating process must be 
considered.  
 
At this stage of the deal, Jemison and Sitkin (1986) point to four common 
phenomena that can aggravate difficulties occurring during the M&A process. 
The first is the fact that the complexity of M&As often leads the firm to rely on 
a number of experts (such as outside consultants and company taskforces) and 
divide the work load within the company. This is a natural way and, in some 
instances, the only way to cope with the situation. However, this segmentation 
of tasks also means that no one has a complete picture of the factors involved, 
Before deal is signed
- search & screening 
- evaluation of partners 
- negotiations etc.  
DealNeed, 
idea and 
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Value
After deal is signed 
- post M&A integration 
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thus the advice given from experts might not be optimal. Often, senior CEO’s 
from the two firms are the only ones involved with a good understanding of 
the process. This means that outside groups (experts) that move in and out of 
the process, as required, can have a lot of influence, even though their concern 
might not be a successful overall integration (Jemison and Sitkin 1986). Further, 
since activities take place sequentially and groups can work independently, little 
communication between them is likely to occur. This view is also held by 
Stoiber (1999), who says that the process of closing a deal is subject to much 
uncertainty. However, narrowing down the number of people involved in the 
negotiation is likely to benefit the parties as it reduces complexity. On the other 
hand, it can equally be argued that outside experts with a different perspective 
are indeed positive elements as these provide CEO’s with different ways of 
looking at the processes. In such cases, it is important that managers always 
have the end result in mind when weighing advice from these experts.  
 
The second issue highlighted by Jemison and Sitkin (1986) is that many M&A 
processes are rushed due to the energy that stimulates the driving force of the 
process. These forces are many, for example, participant commitment, 
engagement and ego, stubbornness and unwillingness to walk away, secrecy 
which is hard to prolong, and ambiguity. These forces can result in premature 
solutions, less thought through integration process, and, in the end, lower 
chances for value creation. 
 
Expectational ambiguity is the third factor, or force, in the pre-agreement phase 
that can affect value creation and thus the outcome of the deal. When entering 
into negotiations ambiguity is important. It leaves room to discuss differing 
expectations of what the deal will mean for the firms as a whole. However, 
once integration starts, this ambiguity becomes a deteriorating force and is a 
major source of conflict. Trust built under the pre-agreement phase can thus 
break down when parties interpret points differently (Jemison and Sitkin 1986).  
 
Finally, the same authors highlight the misapplication of management systems as an 
impediment to successful M&As. A parent firm’s defensiveness of their skills 
and managerial, cultural, and organisational arrogance can lead to 
misapplication of management systems and the imposition of the parent’s 
approaches and practices on the acquired firm. This creates hostile feelings and 
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resistance in the acquired unit. For example face-to-face contact could facilitate 
and ease this whole stage; it makes it easier to resolve issues (Stoiber 1999).   
3.4 Post agreement M&A issues  
As we have highlighted, a lot of top management time and effort is often spent 
on the searching, screening, negotiation, and closing of the agreement. In such 
cases the integration process is often merely treated as something which “of 
course will occur” or as the “black box of M&As” where things just seem to 
happen (Pablo 1994, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). It might be that business 
leaders become so occupied and engaged in the deal that they take for granted 
that the rest of the organisation is too.  
 
Following this trend has been an academic interest in the integration process in 
M&As and attitudes are changing today. Indeed many business leaders see the 
significance of the integration process as a value creating activity and the 
process where much of the winnings of the M&A can be recouped. In fact, the 
integration process has been argued to be the key to making acquisitions work 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). This is because the possibility of future value is 
not created until capabilities are transferred and people from both organisations 
collaborate in order to create the expected benefits (Salama et al 2003).  
 
Cultural integration, or “acculturation”, is crucial for this strategic goal and 
there has been a debate on whether the best approach is to find a “cultural 
compatible partner” (Cartwright and Cooper 1993) or to manage cultural 
differences (Buono and Bowditch 1989). Like many others (e.g. Salama et al 
2003, Buono and Bowditch 1989), we have taken the standpoint that dealing 
with and managing cultural differences is the most strategically beneficial 
approach to M&A integration. This is justified not least by the fact that mergers 
between Scandinavian firms, which are very similar in culture, fail without an 
active cultural integration process. When cultures are perceived to be similar, 
cultural negligence can have disastrous effects on the outcome of the merger 
(Jönsson 2003). 
3.4.1 The integration process 
The M&A integration process is a delicate and hard-to-manage situation but is 
nevertheless vital for the value creation in the firm. However, judging from the 
high failure rate, it can be concluded that there is currently a lack of 
comprehensive management literature on the subject, which follows the fact 
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that the subject still requires deep understanding and further research. It is also 
important to point out that there is no single success formula and most likely 
never will be. Each M&A integration process is unique with regard to motive, 
resources, location, culture, etc. and thus must be treated individually.  
 
Nevertheless, for a M&A to succeed, the two organisations must learn to 
effectively work together and cooperate. Being aware of how value is created in 
the integration, in which there must be a transfer of strategic capabilities, will 
be a great advantage. Whatever the motive or need for integration, creating an 
atmosphere that supports the transfer of strategic capabilities should remain the main goal of 
the integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). This is difficult 
however as problems that come up during the process of reaching this 
atmosphere, can themselves tend to undermine the goal. It is important to 
point out however that problems should not be avoided at all costs, as 
problems could give valuable insights and highlight important issues. Problems 
and confrontation can thus be argued to be an important source of learning.     
 
By extensive research, including case studies on a number of different M&As 
with different motives, goals and needs for integration, Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) have created a model (see figure 3) of a common set of 
elements in the integration process that remains the same regardless of M&A 
type or level of integration need. The model is illustrated and explained below.  
 
Figure 3: The M&A integration process 
 
 
 
Source: Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) chapter  6-7 
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Transfer of strategic capabilities 
A vital part and aim of integration is the transfer of strategic capabilities. 
According to the model, there are three types of capability transfers 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). The first is operational resource sharing. This is 
straight forward and refers to when capabilities are shared, transferred, or 
given, e.g. combining sales forces or distribution channels. This is associated 
with scope for rationalisation, but hence also organisational trauma as this 
might involve lay-offs and reorganisation. Secondly, there is transfer of functional 
skills. This is often hard and involves both teaching and learning before transfer 
can occur. Further, the more strategic in nature the skill is, the more difficult 
and the more important transfer is. Finally, there is transfer of general management 
skill, when the management of one firm is influenced by management issues of 
strategic direction, e.g. resource allocation or human resource management. 
Additionally, the above also results in combination effects, size-related benefits as 
market and purchasing power. This requires little practical coordination, nor 
does transfer of financial resources, as these do not involve personal 
interactions to a large extent (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991).  
 
This view of transfer of capabilities can be interpreted to rest on a notion that 
all skills and knowledge can in fact be transferred. However, this assumption 
can be questioned; can all types of knowledge really be transferred? Or will 
each individual form its own understanding of the knowledge thus modifying it 
and, if so, will this affect the goal or intended use of the knowledge transferred?  
 
Atmosphere for capability transfer 
Before transfer can occur and regardless of the type of capabilities and the 
method used for transfer, the right atmosphere must be created. In order for 
two firms to interact and work together, reciprocal organisational understanding is 
necessary. This means both must appreciate the other firm’s values, history, 
organisational approach, personal makeup and culture. A prerequisite for 
mutual understanding is willingness to work together. The achievement of this is a 
difficult managerial task, as employees often fear for job security or loss of 
control or power. A general resistance to change and an uncertainty of the 
future are also important issues to deal with if a cooperative spirit is to develop 
in the firms. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) also came to another very 
interesting conclusion; they found that prior experience with acquisitions or with a firm of 
a similar type seemed to increase the willingness to work together. Even experience of 
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mergers talks seemed to help condition the attitudes of people in the 
organisation and improved their acceptance of the deal (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991).  
 
Another requirement for capability transfer is that the capacity to participate in the 
transfer must exist. This means that a critical mass of intellectual and 
organisational abilities, as well as the right people in both firms, must be 
present and able to transfer or receive the capability or knowledge. An 
important aspect of this is that management must realise the importance of this 
and commit additional resources at both the parent and subsidiary levels. 
Discretionary or flexible use of resources provides a basis for dealing with operating 
and strategic contingencies at the operational, corporate, and business unit 
levels. For middle managers this means room for manouvering in the 
integration process and capability transfer (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). 
Thus, adaptation to local needs and problems become possible.   
 
All the issues discussed above are of course very important for a successful 
transfer of capabilities, but in this phase getting a cause-effect understanding of the 
benefits is essential. The broad initial purpose must be clarified in operational 
terms for middle and operation-level managers, who then must work out the 
details for bringing the two firms together. If managers cannot understand the 
nature, source, timing, or the predictability of the expected benefits for the 
merger, it is likely that the chance of succeeding with the integration is reduced. 
It will thus help if managers involved understand how acquired capabilities can 
lead to improved competitive advantage, before they attempt to apply them 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991).     
3.4.2 Integration problems 
Integration problems are common in M&As and an important reason for 
failure. Following is a brief discussion of such problems highlighted in the 
academic literature. Note that we have complemented the above model with, 
what we believe to be missing aspects.   
 
Determinism is a term coined by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) which refers to 
the tendency of managers to cling to the original justification of the M&A, even 
though reality and conditions are changing. Thus, instead of setting a good 
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example, managers themselves are resistant to change and have problems 
adapting.  
 
Value destruction is the second big problem identified by the same authors and 
can be seen as the outcome of what Buono and Bowditch (1989) referred to as 
the “human side of M&As”. An M&A is ultimately a human process. Thus 
stress and tensions are almost always involved, even in the “friendly” mergers. 
It is common that employees experience psychological repercussions of this 
stress. These reactions are the sources of many other problems in the M&A 
process as a whole. Human beings are habitual and they often react with anxiety 
and uncertainty to the many ambiguities in M&As (Buono and Bowditch 1989). A 
realistic communication and preview of the M&A process can reduce this stress 
and help to retain trust among employees (Schweiger and DeNisi 1999). Grief 
over the loss of old routines and the “old” firm is also common and can be 
intense (Buono and Bowditch 1989). Other common reactions include 
employees that become paranoid and frozen and show traits like unwillingness 
to work towards the success of the M&A, ignorance towards new policies, and 
lack of taking initiative and compromising. Ultimately some even leave the 
organisation as a reaction to the stress (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991).     
 
These reactions to changes can distract employees from their ordinary work 
responsibilities. Instead of working effectively, employees discuss the merger 
with each other and wonder about the future. Actually one estimate states that 
two hours per day is lost per employee. Thus, individuals or processes which 
were expected to create value, instead destroy value and limit the chances for  a 
successful transfer of capabilities. Additionally, the preoccupation with the 
M&A can have deteriorating personal effects such as sleeplessness, increased 
smoking and drinking, and headaches which affects health and productivity 
negatively (Buono and Bowditch 1989). Rationalisation, changes in benefits and 
bonus systems, and standardisation of policies can also lead to economic 
destruction for the individual employee (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991).  
 
Erosion of trust is a common effect of M&As, no matter how management 
approaches the process (Buono and Bowditch 1989). This in turn often results 
in self-centred behaviour among employees who are then not creating value for 
the firm to the same extent. Not only can actual actions taken by management 
affect the outcome of the integration and the extent of stress experienced by 
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employees, but employee expectations are also influential in this aspect. 
Research has, for example, indicated that unrealistic expectations are a 
significant cause of lack of success in change programs. Further, it has been 
shown that pre-M&A expectations of employees, managers, and shareholders 
are usually unfulfilled after the merger has been implemented. 
Underperformance, slow learning, and dissatisfaction are common reactions, 
many of which can be avoided by sound expectations of the outcome. 
Unfulfilled expectations are also serious because they can undermine trust and 
commitment (Buono and Bowditch 1989). Finally, studies have indicated that 
employees that are given a realistic picture of the future after the merger are 
more likely not to experience any severe stress and have a more stable level of 
commitment, trust, satisfaction, and performance (Schweiger and DeNisi 
1999).  
 
Leadership vacuum is the lack of appropriate leadership for the combined firms. 
In a situation such as an M&A, where value could easily be destroyed and many 
employees experience stress, strong and visionary leadership is required, both in 
human resource matters and operational issues. Haspeslagh and Jemison’s 
(1991) study showed that the possibilities for creating a positive atmosphere, 
where capabilities can be transferred, were extensively limited if there was a 
lack of strong leadership. Without an understanding of motives and how the 
two firms can work together and create value, integration becomes hard and 
firms continue as two separate units. However, as senior managers tend to put 
all energy into the negotiations around and closing of the deal, they often leave 
the integration to lower level management (Pablo 1994). This lack of attention 
to the integration could explain many failed M&As. Haspeslagh and Jemison’s 
study (1991) further showed that institutional leadership was often missing, as 
decisions and understanding regarding integration was harder than focusing on 
performance.        
3.4.3 Cultural integration 
Even though Haspeslagh and Jemison’s model (1991) is comprehensive and 
often cited, they fail to include one important aspect, the influence of culture 
and cultural integration. Cultural integration is a large part of the integration 
process and it has been suggested that cultural disturbance in M&As can cost as 
much as 25-30% in lost performance (Larsson 1991). The acculturation process 
is often held accountable for the failure to successfully implement an 
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organisational integration strategy (Salama et al 2003). The issue is therefore 
treated separately in this section. Culture is defined as a “complex whole, which 
includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (Buono and Bowditch 1989). Organisational 
culture is in turn “the normative glue that holds organisations together through tradition, 
patterns and expectations that emerge over time” (Buono and Bowditch 1989).  
 
Cultural confrontation and adaptation influences all processes undertaken in 
the firms after the M&A agreement is signed. Such problems can hinder the 
knowledge transfer and learning in the merging firms. Cultural integration can 
not be seen as a separate step in the M&A process, it is rather a simultaneous 
process. The cultural integration process can be divided into three different 
phases; 1) Threat against the own culture; which is the first reaction when both 
groups feel threatened by the other and are insecure about the future, 2) 
Cultural confrontation; both parts become aware of their own and the others 
culture, a “we and them” spirit develops. There is a polarisation of views of the 
colliding cultures, and finally 3) Acculturation; the actual combining or creation 
of a new common culture where the power relationship is equal (Schweizer 
2003).  
 
Merger acculturation does not necessarily mean that the previous two corporate 
cultures are replaced and a new is formed nor does it mean one firm has to 
become and behave like the other. Acculturation can occur on many levels. 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) for example identified four levels or modes 
of acculturation, ranging from integration (note that here integration is 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh term for a specific occurrence), where firms keep 
their cultural identity and there is no active strategy to change this. Instead, a 
common culture eventually grows to assimilation where one firm is forced to 
conform to the other. Before choosing an acculturation mode, firms should 
analyze and assess the cultural situation. There must be a fit between the desire 
to preserve their own culture, cultural tolerance and attractiveness, and 
appropriateness of both cultures in the new setting.   
3.4.4 Difficulties with cultural integration  
As national, societal, and corporate cultures often are deeply rooted in 
individuals and organisational heritage, problems and difficulties can arise 
during the cultural integration process. The problems and hindrances to be 
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overcome in cultural integration have been widely discussed and debated in 
literature and among practitioners. Below, the most prevalent findings are 
summarised.   
 
In M&As, acquired managers may lose some of their previous power and become 
restricted in their autonomy. They might then feel dominated by and inferior to 
the acquiring executives. This in turn also means that acculturation problems 
will come up, which influences all employees. To avoid this, the acquired firm 
should be given a high degree of autonomy. However, this rarely happens. If 
there is large size differences between the two firms, feelings of unimportance 
may also arise and with that an unwillingness to confront, understand, and 
adapt to the acquiring firm’s culture (Larsson and Lubatkin 2001).  
 
Another frequently discussed issue is relatedness. Two topics end up under this 
heading, namely cultural relatedness and the possibilities for synergistic returns. 
On the issue of cultural compatibility there seems to be no uniform opinion 
among academics. Some argue that considering cultural compatibility is a vital 
prerequisite for making M&As work (Cartwright and Cooper 1993), while 
many others argue that cultural differences are no hindrances to the success of 
M&As as long as they are managed correctly (e.g. Salama et al 2003, Larsson, 
and Lubatkin 2001). When it comes to synergistic effects, these are often the 
motives behind M&As. However, paradoxically, studies have shown that the 
more products, markets, and technologies that overlap, the greater the 
expectations of synergistic returns, but also the greater potential of cultural 
conflicts and problems in the integration process. The study concluded that a 
high level of integration of human resources was necessary for utilisation of 
synergy effects and that this in turn could lead to situations where integration 
problems came up (Larsson and Lubatkin 2001).  
 
Most, if not all problems in cultural integration involve the individual 
employees’ feelings, behaviour, and reactions to the M&A situation. This is why 
social control (non-authoritarian and informal) is another important aspect of 
acculturation contributing to the success of the M&A integration in general. 
Following the same logic as above, it has been pointed out that the more 
formal integration efforts or mechanisms, such as change of operating and 
reward systems, management, and name that are applied to impose the buying 
firms culture on the acquired firm, the less likely cultural integration becomes. 
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On the other hand, the more the firms rely on social control the greater the 
chance of achieving acculturation. Social control can be exerted by forming 
teams and task forces, informal communication, joint socialisation, and by 
promoting teamwork (across and between units, countries, departments, etc) 
(Larsson and Lubatkin 2001). Social control also has positive effects as it helps 
eliminate negative pre-merger assumptions, such as stereotyping, before or 
during the integration process. In fact, the study conducted by Larsson and 
Lubatkin (2001) concludes that social control is the only important factor that 
can avoid cultural clashes or problems in the cultural integration. By engaging 
employees in socialisation the two units are likely to create their own 
organisational culture as long as they are allowed autonomy. Actually, the study 
showed that social control could overcome all the other potential problems 
outlined above. Further support also comes from a study of a hostile takeover 
where the tensions and discrepancies were intense in the early stage. However, 
social controls and interactions, such as visits, transfers, and communication 
helped to overcome the uneasy relationship and to overcome the inter-cultural 
problems. In fact, these social measures even resulted in a strong, positive 
impact on the acquired employees’ respect for the acquiring firm’s belief in 
personal prospects (Bresman et al 1999).  
 
Social control and social factors are indeed tremendously influential in the 
integration process. Two-way communication is a significant route to social 
control and an important aspect of a successful integration strategy. Research 
on the reasons for failure of M&As first and foremost point to “people issues”. 
High-impact communication during a merger can win trust, build commitment, 
and keep employees focused on the job and thus the value of the deal can be 
captured. Communication can also tone down damage caused by rumours and 
can relieve some of the M&A stress many experience. In fact, it has been 
argued that communication ranks as one of the top ten drivers of merger 
success. Again, however, because communication is time consuming, tough, 
and not legally required, resources are seldom spent on communication 
(Hutchison 2002). It is also important to note that not all communication is 
necessarily helpful. As a matter of fact, one study found a positive correlation 
between some forms of formal communication and conflict. However, such 
communication was often indiscrete and experienced as disrespectful, one 
example being a video message from a CEO imposing the acquiring firm’s 
culture on the acquired part (Whalen 2002).  
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Difficulties during cultural integration can result in resistance and lower 
commitment and cooperation among acquired employees, greater turnover 
among acquired managers, a decline in shareholder value at the buying firm and 
a deterioration in operating performance at the acquired firm (Larsson and 
Lubatkin 2001). All together this means of course drastic value destruction for 
the M&A, making cultural integration central.  
3.4.5 National Cultures and international M&A integration 
Due to several reasons, international M&As are more difficult than domestic 
M&As. The geographical distance alone makes the integration processes more 
complicated. Especially in aspects such as social control that requires 
interaction. Further, international M&As not only have to consider 
organisational culture and what effects it can have on the M&A process, they 
also have to consider national culture and/or local societal cultures. National 
culture is deeply rooted in people and society and as such it influences 
corporate cultures and conducts. In fact, national culture is often stronger than 
corporate culture, shown in Hofstede’s (1980) classical study of IBM’s strong 
corporate culture and how it differed across countries. To understand national 
cultures and how they affect business life is important in every international 
M&A. This provides managers with a good foundation for understanding 
differences, why these exist, and how they can be managed.  
 
National, local, and societal culture also influence managers as management is 
embedded in the wider societal setting. Local history and cultural norms 
influence the underlying values of management style. This in turn determines 
the broad direction of corporate cultures. In fact, empirical evidence shows that 
management is affected by national culture and it has even been shown that the 
post-acquisition control is influenced by national administrative heritage 
(Angwin 2001). Further, national culture has been found to be a good 
determinant of many common managerial problems related to human resource 
management, especially in situations such as cross-boarder M&As (Segalla 
2001). Managers from different cultures perceive the business environment and 
business situation in different ways, putting focus on different risks, 
opportunities, and solutions. Their decisions and actions reflect how they try to 
control these factors.  
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Having understood the M&A process, its stages, and common problems we 
now move on to the next theoretical field. 
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4 BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
Chapter four guides the reader through some important business relationship literature, 
starting at the network level and finishing on the single business relationship. Literature will 
also be related to the Bt industry where suitable.  
4.1 Starting at the network level 
Business studies used to be the study of the firm as a single unit and researchers 
presumed managers always acted in economically rational ways. Today, the 
focus of research is moving away from this, as academics realise that firms 
neither operate alone nor act only for economic reasons. Instead, concepts like 
networks, relationships, trust, commitment, and social influence are widely 
discussed. Market or hierarchy are no longer seen as the only or most efficient 
alternatives facing today’s firms. The network approach views all organisations 
as part of a network and its environment as consisting of other networks. 
Hence, everyone is in one way or another connected, it is often referred to as 
being embedded (Andersson et al 1997).  
 
This is especially true for Bt businesses where, as mentioned, networks and 
collaboration are crucial organisational ingredients in the corporate strategy of 
firms. Instead of product exchanges, R&D projects using tacit knowledge are 
often collaborated around. These are hard to evaluate or transfer via arms-
length arrangements. In many instances there are no clear boundaries between 
buyer and seller. The network form of economic organisation has thus proved 
to be especially useful in this industry (Shan 1990).  
 
Much has been written on the topic of why Bt firms need strategic alliances and 
other forms of collaborations, relationships, and access to networks for success 
and survival (Gries et al 1995, Liebeskind et al 1996, Powell et al 1996, Powell 
1998, Baum et al 2000). The Bt sector is rich in knowledge and knowledge is 
also one of the most important competitive advantages in this industry. Much 
of the research concerning alliances and networks has shown that inter-
organisational relationships are crucial for sourcing this valuable knowledge, 
consequently contributing to the creation of competitive advantage. It is hence 
argued that a firm’s cooperative arrangements may influence its capabilities as 
well as others’ perceptions of the firm’s capabilities (Baum et al 2002). Baum et 
al (2000), for example, show that the performance of Bt start-ups, in particular 
the innovative-related performance, is dependent on the firm’s alliance 
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network. Further, such alliances may provide opportunities for interaction. 
This, in turn, will lead to the development of new ideas and incentives for the 
extensive sharing of experiences necessary for inter-organisational learning 
(Baum et al 2002). Similarly, Liebeskind et al (1996) argue that the exchange that 
occurs in social networks is likely to contribute to organisational learning and 
flexibility.  
 
So far, business relationships have been presented from a network perspective 
in order to explain how and why business relationships within the Bt industry 
are important. The network view implies that all the firm’s relationships are 
interconnected and one relationship is thus affected by the state of another 
(Anderson et al 1994). Hence, much network research focuses on network 
configuration. We will leave the network perspective here however. In order to 
examine the role of a pre-M&A relationship in the M&A process, we must 
instead move down to the analytical level of one single business relationship. 
We will investigate what it may lead to and what may develop within the 
boundary of the two firms. 
4.2 Taking a closer look at a single business relationship 
A theory of how firms interact and come to depend on each other is the 
Uppsala process model of internationalisation. The model is founded on the 
assumption that lack of knowledge is a major obstacle to internationalisation 
and that this knowledge can be gained by gradual expansion abroad. As the 
firm learns more and continues to root its operation in the new market, it 
becomes committed. This results in improved market knowledge. Knowledge 
about the new market enables the firm to better evaluate risks and 
opportunities and the firm may thus increase its commitment to the market. 
Knowledge thus drives commitment and the process is driven by interplay 
between learning about international operations and commitment to 
international business (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). In sum, a business 
relationship is thus likely to involve increased commitment, learning, and perceived 
risk reduction.  
 
The function of relationships between firms is to make transactions of all kinds 
efficient. This is argued to be achieved by interlinking activities and by 
leveraging resource heterogeneity. Relationships must also be based on a 
mutual self-interest of the actors involved. As the relationships develop, 
activities performed by the actors can be adapted so that the combined 
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efficiency is further enhanced. One such example would be just-in-time. Thus, 
resource adaptation is another example of what business relationships might bring. 
It is also likely that the parts, as the relationship develops, learn about each 
other’s resources and together innovate new and better ways of combining 
resources (Anderson et al 1994).  
 
Set against this background; the assumption that the firm’s capability is rooted 
in the exchange relations of the firm, meaning that its relationships are 
essential, the Uppsala model was developed to suit today’s business reality. The 
authors could identify that in these business relationships, resources and 
processes were gradually adapted to the other part over time, thereby the firms’ 
capabilities were modified. New and unique knowledge development is thus a part 
of the relationship (Andersson et al 1997).  
 
A business relationship, like any form of relationship, does not happen or last 
on its own, it requires investments associated with exchanges with the partner. 
It may take years of costly activities before the partners have demonstrated 
willingness and ability to utilise the impending benefits of the relationship. It 
was highlighted by the authors that such relationships are important assets and 
a platform for future business and knowledge development (Andersson et al 1997). Actors 
can, for example, realise that the cooperation has the potential to increase 
efficiency for both parties (Anderson et al 1994). This, in turn, might even be 
the introduction to M&A activity. 
 
Andersson et al (1997) further argue that the firm’s capabilities are specific to 
the context that the firm operates in, referring to the fact that it is embedded in 
its network. From this perspective the authors go on to suggest that integration 
problems arising in M&As arise from the fact that there is a lack of 
compatibility between the market contexts of the two business firms, since they 
are embedded in separate networks. However, while expanding and committing 
to a new market, the firm also starts building relationships, with e.g. partners, 
suppliers, and customers. It then logically follows that a pre-M&A relationship 
has embedded the firms in the same context and networks and integration 
problems could thus be avoided or at least lessened.  
 
This thought is strengthened by the empirical finding that start-ups experience 
less problems than acquisitions. The conclusion drawn is that this is because 
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start-ups are not embedded in any network of relationships when it is 
integrated into the mother-firm. However, some important circumstances are 
overlooked here. M&As, for example, result in two corporate or even national 
cultures being merged into one; job security might be threatened by 
rationalisation, there is often an imbalance in power relations and so on. All 
factors affecting human actions and reactions, which are not present in start-up 
integration and which are common in M&As and strongly influence the 
efficiency of integration (see further section 3.4.2). We would therefore like to 
add these social factors to the explanation why a start-up integration is easier 
than a M&A integration. However, we believe that in a business relationship, 
these crucial social connections and a social understanding for the other party; 
between the firms and its individuals; starts to develop and will most likely play 
an important role in a later M&A process and the value creation. 
 
Other relevant empirical findings, important to this thesis, have also been made 
by Andersson et al (1997). By looking at subsidiaries’ external (mainly customer) 
embeddedness they discovered that time elapsed after acquisition does not 
influence power relationship or the corporate embeddedness. The authors 
hypothesize that this could be because the acquired unit and the acquiring firm 
already had a relationship. The acquisition was just a legal step without any real 
consequences for the operations. Further, integration did not significantly 
affect the operating structures. From this, the conclusion is drawn that 
acquisition behaviour is organic in nature and thus builds on the same logic as 
the original Uppsala process model. Andersson et al (1997) also stipulate that 
two contextual dimensions impact acquisition behaviour and its consequences; 
extent of previous relationship between the two parts and the companies’ 
psychic distance. These are very interesting conclusions and our thesis can be 
seen as a continuation of this research. However, for reasons explained, we do 
not only think embeddedness is important, but social issues as well. This is why 
we have chosen to look more closely at the social influence a pre-M&A 
relationship might have on the M&A process. In this way, the study could 
contribute to this model.     
 
However before moving on, it is important to note that business relationships 
and networks are not only positive, they also imply structural constrictions on 
the firms (Anderson et al 1994, Andersson et al 1997). Equally, it is possible that 
firms can become locked into relationships by the created dependency it 
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implies. Especially if the power balance shifts during the relationship. Instead 
of working with a strategically superior partner, the firm might then be stuck 
with a less efficient partner due to the switching cost involved. Furthermore, 
business relationships are based on trust and mutual knowledge and they 
comprise intentions, expectations, and interpretations (Andersson et al 1997) – 
but this might not mean that they are economically rational. CEO’s and 
managers often act after their own ego instead of acting in the best interest of 
the firm or shareholders. The strong influence of CEO ego on the 
development of firms was illustrated at a conference with Bt CEO’s where 
everyone agreed M&As in Bt is good. However, everyone also admitted that 
CEO-ego was the largest deterrent (Colyer 1999). When or if business 
relationships become too personal it might be hard to end the relationship. 
Finally, people or businesses might stay in a relationship even though they are 
not satisfied because there are no other alternatives or simply because they feel 
secure and content rather than satisfied. A high level of commitment might 
thus lead to tolerance of undesirable things (Hocutt 1998).   
 
So far, we have examined why being part of a network is important for 
conducting business within the Bt industry, as well as what business 
relationships might result in. The academic literature points to a role of 
previous relationships in the M&A process, that a relationship might be a good 
platform to start M&A activity from. However, in this argumentation we 
identified a missing social aspect. This, together with the many “human-
related” problems in the M&A process, has led us to wonder if there could 
indeed be a deeper social aspect in relationships which could have a role in the 
M&A process. We therefore now move on to explore one-to-one relationships, 
what they entail, and what benefits and risks they may bring. This is done via 
the concept of social capital, which here is used as an instrument to visualise 
what a relationship is founded on.  
4.3 Social capital - a relational concept 
The concept of social capital was formed as society, academics, and 
practitioners were partly moving away from the rational-economic view of the 
firm to a perspective where concepts like knowledge and social networks are 
increasingly important for competitive advantage (Bolino et al 2002). Social 
capital usually refers to an “asset that is derived from social structure of 
relations and can be used for knowledge gathering and dissemination” 
(Edelman et al WP). By now, much has been written about social capital and, as 
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in most research areas, views differ. In the case of social capital, opinions differ 
regarding what its sources are, what it is composed of, as well as which benefits 
and risks it involves (Adler and Kwon 2002). Researchers have therefore 
defined social capital differently, depending on the focus chosen. An accepted 
definition of social capital would be Adler and Kwon’s (2002): “Social capital is 
the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of 
the actor’s social relations. Its effects flow from the information, influence, and solidarity it 
makes available to the actor”. Social capital has some similarities but also 
differences compared to financial and human capital. One similarity is that 
firms must invest to sustain all types of capital. However, social capital is 
unique in that it is collectively owned, increases with use, and dies out if not 
used (Nilsson 2001).  
 
Further, much research on social capital has been conducted within the 
boundary of the firm. However, wherever institutions operate in contexts 
characterised by enduring relationships with relatively high levels of 
interdependence, interaction, and closure dense configurations of social capital 
is likely to emerge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Interaction is a prerequisite 
for maintenance and obtaining of social capital (Nilsson 2001) and thus inter-
firm relationships have the characteristics necessary for developing social 
capital.  
 
We take a slightly different view however of social capital and regard it as a 
relational concept. We look upon social capital as the essence of business relationships. 
What it entails, in turn also affects the relationship and how it can be utilised. 
As such, we argue that social capital can be used as an instrument to 
understand and capture what a business relationship really involves and why it 
is so influential. Thus social capital is the core of the relationship through 
which other benefits can be reached. For example, if a longstanding business 
relationship leads to an important agreement resulting in profitability, the 
relationship between the two parts has most likely affected processes or factors 
leading to the agreement. To understand why, we need to look at the social 
capital in the relationship and the nature of it. Hence, we argue that social 
capital in itself is not a benefit; it is what it leads to that is important. Further, 
we need to regard the social capital to understand why, which in turn makes us 
truly realise the benefit of the relationship and thus how to manipulate it to our 
benefit. Social capital is a relational concept which captures the relationship 
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 43
between two parts. It displays important aspects, feelings and enablers of the 
relationship.     
 
Our definition of social capital is: “Social capital is what is derived from social 
interactions; it is the structure of relations, feelings and emotions in the relation and how these 
are communicated. It is an important asset through which many valuable benefits can be 
reached”.   
 
In arriving at this definition, we have been strongly influenced by Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998), in that we consider their framework very useful. It visualises 
what a relationship entails in a comprehensive manner. However, we have also 
been influenced by the definition given by Adler and Kwon (2002) above. We 
do not regard the effects of social capital as being the capital however. We 
regard these as the benefits and risks of the social capital which should carefully 
be taken into consideration in the M&A process.      
4.4 Sources of social capital 
As noted above, inter-firm relationships are overall characterised by conditions 
that favour the development of social capital. However, social capital is not 
present to the same extent in all relationships and does not develop automatically. 
Adler and Kwon (2002) identify opportunity, motivation, and ability as the sources 
of social capital. These three factors are similar to those that have to be 
satisfied in order for exchange and combination of resources to take place, and 
thus are necessary for the creation of intellectual capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998). Further, the creation of intellectual capital is, as explained, an important 
driver of cooperation in the Bt industry, which is why social capital is likely to 
exist in these constellations. In addition, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) also 
include belief as a source of social capital., Social capital will first develop in an 
inter-firm relationship if all of these sources are present. 
 
First of all, there must exist an opportunity for the two firms to interact and 
exchange resources. Within the boundary of the inter-firm relationship, these 
opportunities consist of social relations (formal, informal, personal, or 
accidental) between people from the two firms. These create opportunities for 
interaction and access to the other’s resources (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). 
This access to resources also coincides well with the Uppsala process model, 
which regards access and adapting to resources as central to the development 
of business relationships. Belief refers to the fact that interaction and exchange 
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of resources will only occur if the two firms believe value will be created 
(Nahpiet and Ghoshal 1998). Thus, if the firms believe cost will outweigh the 
benefit of the exchange, they will not initiate a relationship.  
 
If employees from the two firms do not feel it is worth the effort, the exchange 
and combination of resources will not occur even though both opportunity and 
perceived value creation exist. Motivation is thus the third source. Even though 
employees are not always sure of the return when helping one another, they still 
do. Shared norms, trust, and the willingness and ability of individuals to define 
collective goals are argued to be the motivation behind this behaviour. 
Collective action is facilitated by the norms and forms a collectivity of the inter-
firm relationship. The participants are likely to feel obligations towards the 
other members and a common identity will emerge as well as a commitment to 
the common good. Shared norms are in fact often seen as a key motivational 
source of social capital. However, shared norms do not necessarily function as 
a source of social capital. It is the content of the shared norms that determine if 
they function as a source of social capital. However, egocentric motives, such 
as the desire for career advancement, surviving competitive rivalry, or reduction 
of transaction costs, are also likely to drive relationships (Adler and Kwon 
2002).  
 
Finally, it has been debated whether ability really can be seen as a source of 
social capital, or if it is a complement to social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that the capability of people in the two 
firms to combine information or experiences should be considered as a 
prerequisite for the combination and exchange of resources. Thus, in their 
opinion, it is a source of social capital. Further, the ability of individuals to 
define and implement collective goals is also important (Leana and Van Buren 
1999).  
4.5 Components of social capital 
It can be concluded that social capital might originate from inter-firm 
relationships. However, since social capital differs from relation to relation, the 
nature of the social capital developed is also important. As mentioned above, 
social capital can be viewed from different perspectives. Even though authors 
label aspects differently it is clear which aspects are important in shaping the 
nature of social capital. These will now be discussed. Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s 
(1998) comprehensive review provides a useful framework from which social 
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capital can be analysed. They divide social capital in three dimensions; 
structural, relational, and cognitive. This is also how we have chosen to present 
the topic.   
 
Before moving on however, we would like to point out that these dimensions 
are merely angles from which social capital can be studied. Secondly, it should 
be noted that there is no social capital that is similar to another and that the 
social capital in each inter-firm relationship is uniquely made up of some or all 
aspects of some or all dimensions. Therefore these dimensions are later used to 
analyse and explain what the relationships under investigation are founded on. 
The dimensions are also used in the analysis to explain the nature of the 
relationship and important notations therein.  
4.5.1 Structural dimension 
The structural dimension of social capital refers to how information, 
knowledge, or intellectual capital can be reached in a network or a relationship. 
Structural embeddedness is an important aspect and refers to who you reach 
and how you reach them (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998, Bolino et al 2002). The 
Uppsala process-thinking also talks about embeddedness, referring to the 
different connections and ties a firm has to its external partners. However the 
structural dimension of social capital can be viewed both from a network 
perspective or a one-to-one relationship perspective (ties, configuration, and 
appropriability between employees from different firms). Following is a deeper 
look into what the structural dimension includes.   
 
• Network ties involve the presence, absence, and strength of network (or 
relational) ties between actors. It influences information transfer, inter-
organisational learning, and the execution of inter-organisational activities and 
thus the outcome of the relationship. For example, if employees from the two 
firms know each other it will be easier to carry out inter-organisational activities 
and transmit information and knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
 
• Network configuration describes the pattern of linkages between the two firms. 
Characteristics such as density (the extent to which all employees are 
interconnected relative to the total number of potential connections among all 
employees), connectivity and hierarchy are important (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998). Further, discussions about structural holes (the absence of connections 
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
 46
between employees) and centralisation (the degree to which connections are 
concentrated among few employees) also influence the resulting social capital 
(Bolino et al 2002). In our interest is for example if the relationship between the 
two merging firms is based solely on interactions between management or if 
the relationship is “firm-wide”, implying that there is a wider cooperation and 
maybe even socialisation across all levels of the firms. While the ties provide 
the channels for information transmission, the network configuration 
determines the extent of movement of information, knowledge assistance, and 
flexibility between the firms, since the level of contact or the accessibility of 
network members is influenced (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
 
• Network appropriability is the ease with which different types of relationships 
can be used for purposes other than what they were created for. An example of 
appropriability is when an employee is able to carry out a task more easily 
because he or she has a friend, in the same firm or another firm, who knows 
how to carry out the task. It can also be when cooperation within a specific 
product area gives access to a technology that could potentially be used for 
something else (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
 
To conclude, investigation of the structural dimension includes finding out 
about the extent to which individuals in the two organisations are connected, 
what the pattern of these connections look like, and how useful these 
connections are in various contexts (Bolino et al 2002).  
4.5.2 Relational dimension 
Relational embeddedness concerns the quality and nature of the connections in 
the inter-firm relationship and also influences the nature of social capital 
created. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) have identified the following to be 
important aspects of this dimension.  
 
• Trust and trustworthiness has been identified as vital components of social 
capital (Leana and Van Buren 1999). Trust is seen as being both an antecedent 
to and a result of people working together, as well as a by-product of successful 
collective action. Leana and Van Buren (1999) further distinguish between 
fragile versus resilient trust and dyadic versus generalised trust. Trust is generally seen as 
having elements of the willingness of people to expose themselves to the 
actions of other parties, in other words, being vulnerable. Fragile trust is based 
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on a belief in immediate rewards and is usually governed by formal contracts. It 
is when firms determine the partner trustworthy enough for a single transaction 
and the potential rewards as sufficient for the risk involved. Thus, costs cannot 
exceed benefits. Resilient trust, on the other hand, is likely to survive a 
transaction that does not mean an immediate reward. It is based on numerous, 
strong links between the organisations and its members, not just on formal 
contracts. Resilient trust is also based on previous experience with the other 
firm and/or a belief in its moral integrity. It is argued that norms and values, 
which will be discussed later, unite communities that are characterised by 
resilient trust. Hence, fragile trust is a workable strategy of mutuality while 
resilient trust is instead based upon ongoing norms of mutuality. Dyadic trust 
exists between people that have direct knowledge of one another. However, 
there is another, more impersonal, kind that is based on a feeling that the 
norms and behaviours of a firm apply to all its members. This is referred to as 
generalised trust. Thus, regardless of whether employees from one firm know 
actors from the other firm directly, or have interacted with them, they will be 
trusted and this trust can very well be of the resilient type. It is argued that 
systems, in this case inter-firm relationships, with strong social capital are 
characterised by generalised trust. Hence, resilient and generalised trust can be 
said to indicate that human actions are embedded in social relations, thus 
pointing towards strong social capital (Leana and Van Buren 1999).  
 
• Norms and sanctions of openness and teamwork, with emphasis on 
cooperation instead of competition, open disclosure of information, and loyalty 
to the firm are often found in knowledge-intensive firms. In an inter-firm 
context such norms enable, enhance, and make the relationship efficient. Such 
norms will also give inter-firm relationships stability and a good foundation to 
create value from. Further, norms of a willingness to welcome and respond to 
diversity, openness to criticism, and tolerance of failure are also considered 
important since such norms are likely to prevent negative restrictive group 
thinking (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
  
• Obligations and expectations An obligation means a commitment to undertake 
some activity in the future. Obligations can be formal, professional, and 
personal (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). A relationship can also lead to 
expectations of obligations, which can affect the social capital depending on 
whether it is realised or not (Bolino et al 2002).   
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Relational social capital can thus be said to involve emotional intensity which 
results in people from the two firms starting to like, trust, and identify with one 
another.  
4.5.3 Cognitive dimension 
The third dimension of social capital is the cognitive which concerns whether 
members of the inter-firm relationship share a common view and whether they 
really understand one another. This depends on the following:   
 
• Shared narratives can be explained as the myths, stories, and metaphors that 
are communicated within an organisation. They are likely to enable the 
employees to interpret and understand their experiences in similar ways. It has 
been demonstrated to facilitate the exchange of practice and tacit experience 
between people, thereby enabling the discovery and development of improved 
practice (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). In an inter-firm relationship, these 
narratives are likely to be shared over time and eventually employees from the 
two firms might be familiar with the narratives of the other firm. It could also 
be the case that new common narratives are created as a result of the 
interaction of the two firms. 
 
• Shared language and codes as well as shared narratives, will alleviate discussions 
and facilitate the transfer of ideas and sharing of knowledge among employees 
from the two firms. Further, high levels of cognitive social capital are likely to 
give employees a common perspective that enables them to perceive events 
similarly (Bolino et al 2002).  
 
Consequently, shared language, codes, and narratives increase the level of 
understanding among employees and the two firms. Additionally, as time goes 
by, efficiencies will be gained through mutual awareness and a reduction in the 
number of unexpected behaviours performed by employees (Bolino et al 2002).  
 
Having reviewed and treated the M&A process as well as the field of business 
relationships, we now move on to integrate these. We ask how and why firms 
can benefit from social capital and focusing on potential benefits and risks 
during an M&A process.   
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5 SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE M&A PROCESS 
Chapter five illustrates our theoretical integration and analysis of potential benefits and risks 
of social capital in the M&A process. These are visualised in a model and discussed.  
 
The picture that emerges from the reviewed literature points to the great 
importance of relationships in business. Relationships have many functions and 
sources and require continuous investments. A functional business relationship 
has all the sources necessary to develop social capital, which is why social 
capital is likely to be present. A good business relationship is not something 
that can be initiated and utilised instantaneously. Instead, a beneficial business 
relationship is rather like a process that changes and develops over time, it 
organically evolves while ties, bonds, commitment, and trust becomes stronger 
and deeper as time passes by, the relationship strengthens and thus also the 
social capital.  
 
It is in human nature to desire a feeling of security. When the organisational 
security is disrupted by, for example, an M&A, employees experience confusion 
and stress, as discussed above. This reduces motivation, cooperative spirit, 
willingness to engage, productivity, initiative taking, commitment, and trust, 
among other things. This threatens the long-term value creation and ultimately 
the competitive advantage of the firm. Social factors have shown to be both 
responsible for much of the problems as well as being a solution to many of 
those issues. Due to the creation of social capital, we believe that a previous 
relationship has the potential to influence the situation (positively or 
negatively).  
 
A discussion will now follow dealing with the positive and negative 
consequences a business relationship and the social capital developed could 
have in the M&A process. The potential consequences have all been identified 
by our theoretical analysis of the two fields and are illustrated in figure 4 below. 
These are then explained and outlined in the following text.   
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Figure 4: The benefits and risks of social capital in the M&A process 
 
 
 
Note: Risks illustrated in boxes with broken lines, benefits are underlined. The figure does not explain 
interrelationships between risks and benefits.  
 
Source: Lindau-Jonsson and Persson (2003) 
5.1 Social capital - a valuable resource 
Authors in the field have identified several benefits of social capital and these 
will be complemented by our own analysis of potential benefits of social capital 
in the M&A process. However, first of all, if social capital should be of value 
for the two firms engaging in the business relationship, there needs to be a "fit" 
between the aspects of the social relations and thus the nature of the social 
capital developed, and the reason why they have a relationship (Adler and 
Kwon 2002). This "fit" is also important for the role of a pre-M&A relationship 
in the M&A process. 
5.1.1 Individual commitment to the collective good and realisation of technical fit and 
synergies 
Social capital can make people put organisational interests before their own. 
Collective goals and norms can make people feel it is worth doing things that 
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provides a context in which people decide whether it is worth putting 
individual interests aside or not (Leana and Van Buren 1999). Hence, it is our 
belief that if trust created in a pre-M&A relationship is maintained in the M&A 
process it might enhance the willingness of people to work towards the good of 
the new organisation. They will then not start to pursue their own self-interests.  
 
Further, whereas a cause-effect-understanding is important to employee 
commitment and motivation, we believe a pre-M&A relationship could provide 
employees with a foundational understanding of the causes and effects of the 
relationship. Further it might also offer employees and management a realistic 
picture of what synergies to expect from the deal. This would in turn enable an 
understanding and realisation of the potential benefits of the M&A. For 
example, a relationship that involves cooperative R&D, technical application, 
or joint production could reveal beforehand if the two firms technically fit, 
complement, or compete with each other. As this is a common motive for 
M&As such benefits of a previous relationship could be important. If 
employees in all levels of the organisation experience this, explaining and 
tackling other problems occurring during the M&A process will be much easier.  
5.1.2 Facilitator of flexible work organisation 
Hierarchical control mechanisms have proven ineffective to promote flexible 
and productive work practices within organisations. Instead, practices can be 
organised to rely on trust between employees and management, as well as 
associability norms and cross-functional cooperation. This is likely to enable 
companies to adopt flexible and/or high-performance work practices. This is 
especially the case in organisations characterised by high levels of social capital. 
Further, presence of social capital is also said to lead to longer job tenure and 
higher trust. This is important since durability of relationships can be an 
important factor for flexibility since it involves significant cooperation, trust, 
and coordination among different functions in the organisation (Leana and Van 
Buren 1999).  
 
It can be argued that Bt firms, more than other firms, are dependent upon 
collaboration, flexible work practices, and teamwork of reasons discussed 
earlier. Thus, social capital is likely to be beneficial if practices can rely on trust 
and associability between employees and management from the two firms. In 
the M&A situation it is also clear that a flexible organisation will cope better 
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with the changes it brings. Flexibility will thus lead to less resistance to change 
and the M&A process will be easier.  
5.1.3 Managing collective action and creating a cooperative spirit 
Rather than relying on hierarchical control, firm relationships strong in social 
capital can instead utilise relational contracts and norms as control mechanisms. 
Consequently, people from the two firms can work well together because of a 
shared understanding regarding work organisation, implicit norms, and 
generalised resilient trust (Leana and Van Buren 1999).  
 
In a functional and effective pre-M&A relationship parties are likely to have 
gained experience of and knowledge about each other, which in turn forms 
resilient trust. Over time, as the social capital strengthens, this may develop into 
generalised trust. Thus, employees will trust each other and work well together, 
even though they have not previously interacted or had personal experiences 
with each other. This is especially desirable in an integration process. It has also 
been argued that trust facilitates social and resource exchange, increases 
communication, and enhances cooperation between individuals leading to 
enhanced teamwork and improved organisational function. These benefits 
coincide with those identified as desirable for an atmosphere for capability 
transfer in an integration process. Thus we believe presence of resilient and 
generalised trust is of great importance in an integration process. 
 
It has also been argued that group identification is positively associated with 
communication and cooperation. We therefore argue that a pre-M&A 
relationship might mean employees identify with each other, meaning that a 
collaborative atmosphere is present.  
 
Returning to the discussion about social control, it is further our belief that the 
presence of trust is an important aspect of social control.  In fact it is our belief 
that social control can be said to rest upon social capital. Hence, we argue that 
trust created in a pre-M&A relationship would alleviate when the M&A occurs.  
5.1.4 Conflict resolution  
Strong social norms and high levels of trust can also enable faster dispute 
resolutions. The emergence of a bad atmosphere with angry feelings can thus 
be prevented (Adler and Kwon 2002).  
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Consequently, in a pre-M&A relationship with established relational ties, 
employees learn to collaborate and handle conflict and may also start to adapt 
to each other. This might also mean people will not feel as threatened by the 
other firm and its employees, compared to M&As, in which they have never 
interacted before. We believe this might also mean that a “we versus them” 
feeling is not as likely to occur.  
5.1.5 Information  
Social capital enables individuals to access more sources of information as well 
as improves the quality, relevance, and timeliness of that information. It has 
been shown, for example, that inter-organisational networks help firms acquire 
new skills and knowledge. Further, network ties influence information transfer, 
organisational learning, and the execution of organisational activities (Adler and 
Kwon 2002). In a network with high degrees of trust and solidarity, more 
sensitive and rich information is likely to be transmitted.  
 
We believe the M&A process could benefit from this aspect, since established 
ties might lead to informal information transfer. We believe such informal 
channels are suitable for tacit and strategic knowledge transfer.  Such transfer is 
of utmost importance in a M&A situation, hence also such social capital. 
5.1.6 Understanding each other 
The cognitive dimension of social capital enables people at the two firms to 
anticipate and predict the actions of each other. If members of the two 
companies do not understand each other, problems are likely to occur and 
affect the M&A process. Discussing problems, transferring ideas, sharing 
knowledge, and offering effective assistance to each other would be hard. 
Further, the probability of developing a common perspective that enables 
employees to perceive events in a similar way would be limited. In international 
business relationships this is likely to be a hindrance in the beginning of the 
relationship. Even if both parties speak English it is always harder to express 
one self in a foreign language and underlying, often unconsciously transmitted, 
messages and hints are hard to catch. Such messages can indeed be very 
important and can have cultural components to it. It is therefore likely that it 
will take longer to establish trust and other important aspects for social capital, 
as communication is vital for this. However, as a relationship establishes over 
time, a common inter-firm language also grows and communication is no 
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longer a limitation to the relationship building. Thus, it is our belief that a pre-
M&A relationship leads to prior experience of each other’s cultures, codes and 
languages. The occurrence of such problems would then be restricted.  
 
Shared narratives are also important for understanding each other and 
interpreting events in similar ways. It has been argued to facilitate the exchange 
of practice and tacit experience between people. It is likely that during a pre-
M&A relationship parties have come to hear and become familiar with each 
others’ myths and stories. It might also be that they have developed common 
histories and heroes as a result of their interaction.  
 
Shared norms and beliefs in the surrounding environment are also likely to 
influence the value of social capital. For example, entrepreneurship might be 
seen as legitimate in one context, whereas in another context it might be seen 
as opportunistic and self-seeking (Adler and Kwon 2002). Norms and sanctions 
promoting openness, teamwork, and cooperation have been argued to be 
found within knowledge-intensive firms. Hence, we believe a sound 
atmosphere for capability transfer and a collaborate spirit can partly arise due to 
industry-wide norms and sanctions where collaboration with many actors is 
important. Consequently, even though not the focus of this thesis, one must 
also be aware of the fact that the surroundings of the two firms might influence 
the value of social capital created and later the value creation in the M&A 
process. In turn, this might also mean that one should be careful to ascribe the 
pre-M&A relationship and social capital developed too much importance in 
certain situations. 
5.1.7 Diminishes cultural hostility  
The above analysis has illustrated the many potential roles and routes that 
social capital and a previous relationship could have in the M&A process. 
Cultural integration is an important aspect of the integration process, not least 
in international M&As, where there is a great likelihood that cultures differ to a 
large extent. The cultural integration process consists of three steps. The first 
step is the threat against the own culture and the second is the cultural 
confrontation, when both firms become aware of and evaluate the other’s 
organisational culture. A previous relation is likely to drive employees to not 
feel threatened but instead to become aware and evaluate the other firm’s 
culture. In such a situation, this evaluation is carried through in a neutral setting 
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where the employee can objectively analyse the positive and negative sides of 
both organisation’s cultures. This objective setting can not be achieved in the 
M&A process and will most likely result in a more fair judgement. A pre-
understanding of the other firm’s culture is likely to reduce the cultural stress 
and give a propensity to not be afraid of the other culture and increase the 
willingness to adapt. Maybe the cultural integration following a merger between 
two firms with a common history can jump-start at stage three, the 
acculturation, as illustrated in figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Overview of how a previous relationship can influence the cultural integration 
 
      
Source: Lindau-Jonsson and Persson (2003)  
 
It might also be the case that in a pre-M&A relationship parties start to share 
each other’s values, beliefs, and assumptions as a natural consequence of the 
pressure-free interaction between the companies.  
 
However, it is important to point out that these effects will depend on the 
network configuration and appropriability. They will depend on, for example, 
the density of ties. Our interest is, for example, if the relationship is based only 
on ties between management, or if ties can be found throughout the firm, and 
how and if this “relationship-width” is of importance. It could be, for example, 
that if a relationship is solely between top management, it will not impact the 
integration in any aspect or it could lead to hostile feelings in other levels of the 
firms.  
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5.1.8 Facilitates creation of intellectual capital 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) have described how social capital facilitates the 
creation of intellectual capital. In line with previous reasoning concerning social 
capital in an inter-organisational context, a business relationship between two 
firms, in which social capital has developed, is thus also likely to lead to the 
creation of intellectual capital (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
 
Interaction and the sharing of experiences, knowledge, resources, and 
information are common goals of M&A. In a pre-M&A relationship, a 
cooperative atmosphere most likely exists, as mentioned before. With this, 
routines for communication, transfer of skills and capabilities, and an 
understanding of the other part are already established. The condition for 
creation of intellectual capital is thus founded and tested before an agreement is 
reached.  The value destruction can hence be limited or reduced as long as the 
conditions and forms for the cooperation after the integration are not 
completely different.   
5.2 Negative consequences of social capital 
Having presented a number of benefits that could potentially arise from social 
capital, it is now important to note that it is dangerous to only view social 
capital as something positive. Social capital may just as well be useless or 
harmful. It is possible that a “merger situation” will always be so different from 
a “cooperation situation” that in fact it will never make any difference whether 
the firms have had a previous relationship or not. These aspects will also be 
considered in the empirical investigation. A discussion concerning negative 
consequences of social capital will therefore follow. 
 
First, it should be noted that firms that have neither internal nor external ties 
obviously will not develop high levels of social capital. Equally, a firm with high 
internal linkages but low external linkages is neither likely to develop strong 
social capital as a result of the inter-firm relationship. Additionally, if ties are 
low, it might lead to reduced solidarity within the firms, which might harm the 
inter-firm relationship in the end. (Adler and Kwon 2002). 
5.2.1 Overinvestment 
Investments in social capital are not possible to reverse or convert without any 
cost. Therefore, unbalanced investments or over-investments in social capital 
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can create constraints and liabilities. Further, social capital investment may not 
always be cost efficient. Sometimes weak ties are said to be more effective than 
strong because they are less costly to maintain. (Adler and Kwon 2002).  
5.2.2 Becoming locked with a partner 
Social capital can “lock” or “over-embed” a firm into a relationship with the 
“second best” partner, as strong solidarity and commitment can lead to 
tolerance of undesirable things. Social and personal relationships can thus 
hinder actions and reduce the flow of new ideas into the group (Carroll and 
Stanfield 2003, Hocutt 1998). In some cases when ties are strong it hinders 
others to access the network, resulting in missed opportunities of collaboration.  
 
We also suggest business relationships could lock partners into a relationship 
which is sustained for reasons other than benefits for the firms’ stakeholders. 
One article for example pointed to the importance of golf in business life. Is it 
then possible that two firms continue to cooperate, not because the 
relationship is economically beneficial or creates value or opportunities for one 
another, but rather because managers have developed a deep personal 
relationship, because they belong to the same social club or equivalent. Such a 
pre-M&A relationship of course has other prerequisites to successfully enhance 
value in the M&A process, as compared to a relationship based upon 
fundamental value gains and sustained on strong bonds, commitment, and 
trust. Therefore, the motive and nature of the pre-M&A relationship are 
important to this discussion   
5.2.3 Reforming cooperative conditions 
A deep and evolving business relationship naturally embeds the firm in its 
network of relationships. As previously discussed, this embeddedness, or rather 
the fact that two merging firms might be embedded in different settings, makes 
the integration of firms difficult. This is because longstanding relationships with 
firms involve so much investment, ties, bonds, commitment, and trust which 
then have to be broken or reformed. It is possible these problems could also 
appear when a pre-M&A relationship has been established and its routines and 
conditions have been stated. If the conditions for the relationship or 
cooperation change, is it possible that confusion and problems that appear will 
actually be larger than if the two partners never met before? Further, it is thus 
possible that social capital developed in the pre-M&A relationship served its 
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purpose very well in that context but when put in the context M&As, it might 
not fit any more. Hence, we would like to point out that it might not be 
possible to assume that the conditions and factors that hold for a pre-M&A 
relationship will hold after an M&A. There might be a change in the balance of 
power and changes in management structure and influences and these changes 
might in turn change the conditions for the previous relationship. Thus, it 
might be dangerous to assume that a working relationship can be kept after a 
drastic change such as an M&A. 
5.2.4 Blind the organisation 
A previous relationship might equally create overly high expectations and blind 
the organisation to the large changes and challenges a merger or acquisition 
actually consists of. As stated above, lack of attention to the integration 
process, both in terms of effort and resources, is one of the most common 
pitfalls resulting in failure. Hence a previous relationship could in fact 
predispose the merger or acquisition to failure, rather than success.    
5.2.5 Erosion of trust  
M&As are very special occurrences and it is possible that many aspects, actions 
and activities during the process could erode trust created earlier. Further, the 
trust in the partner’s ability can create too high of expectations for the M&A. 
These expectations are then likely to lead into disappointment which could 
eventually erode the trust created earlier. 
 
Even though the discussion has mainly argued for a positive role for a pre-
M&A relationship and social capital in the M&A process, all the above 
possibilities will be considered during the empirical study. The empirical study 
will thus not aim to justify or prove the theory and initial beliefs wrong; the empirical 
investigation will instead examine the reality. Our understanding of the reality will 
then be analysed and compared to theory and our initial understanding. Then 
these will be justified, dismissed, or amended. 
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6 RESULTS AND CASE-ANALYSIS 
This chapter will present the empirical findings in the form of case-stories. This enables the 
reader to easily access results as well as it aims to capture the atmosphere and essence. For this 
reason we have also chosen to use first names rather than titles and sir names. All 
information presented is from the subjects interviewed (see section 2.2.2) if not otherwise 
stated. After each case a case-analysis will follow.  
6.1 Case A: Abigo Medical AB-DHC 
The Abigo group is privately owned and consists of the mother-firm Abigo 
Medical AB and its three sister-firms. Abigo Medical AB is a fast growing 
Swedish Bt/pharmaceutical company that develops and produces its own 
products as well as promoting these in the market. The product line holds 35 
pharmaceuticals and products for wound care and ear de-pressurising. The firm 
conducts R&D, in which it cooperates with academic researchers and 
institutions. The three sister-firms are Dansk Helsemiddel Center A/S (DHC), 
Abigo AS in Denmark and Sylak AB based in Sweden (www.abigo.com). This 
case study has focused on the Danish sister-firm DHC.  
 
DHC is a distributing sister-firm wholly owned by Abigo, which markets a 
broad product line of their own and licensed self-care products. DHC 
specifically focuses on naturopathic pharmaceuticals and is one of the leading 
firms in the Danish market (www.abigo.com).  
 
DHC started in 1979 and at that time was a pioneer in the Danish health food 
market. A few years later, in 1982, Abigo was searching for a Danish distributor 
and screened the Danish market for a suitable partner. Jan and Leif, Abigo’s 
owners, came across DHC and a meeting was arranged. They met and DHC 
immediately won Jan and Leif’s trust and respect as Jan, Leif and the former 
owner, Henrik Müntzberg, “clicked”. They got on and there was a mutual 
feeling of connection. DHC was thus chosen as a partner. “DHC was not chosen 
because they were the best and largest distributor in Denmark, but rather because the personal 
chemistry felt good, they were good people”, Leif commented. As a small private firm 
the owners did not have to justify their decision to anyone and criteria for 
choosing a company to acquire, or anything similar, were therefore not set.  
 
The distribution agreement lasted for five years, until 1989 and throughout this 
period no written contracts were ever established; “it wasn’t necessary – we trusted 
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them and they trusted us”, Jan said. “Anyway, I think oral agreements are stronger then 
written ones and this is how we do business”, he continued. The relationship 
functioned as an ordinary distribution agreement. DHC bought Abigo’s 
products on invoice as often as their stock ran out and there was no sales 
commission. Jan and Leif had no formal influence over the sales and marketing 
materials. However; “for sure we had control”, Jan laughed meaning that to a 
certain extent they decided what could and could not be said or shown about 
their products. 
 
In 1989 Henrik suddenly and unexpectedly passed away and DHC faced an 
uncertain future. Without a buyer the firm would have to shut down. As 
Abigo’s products were the core of DHC, the estate administrator approached 
Jan and Leif and asked if they would be interested in continuing the agreement 
if another firm bought DHC. Abigo at that time was dependent on DHC for 
their sales in Denmark and wanted to continue, but only on the condition that 
they felt comfortable with the new owner. “Personal chemistry, contact, and respect is 
essential for business, all business is personal”, Leif explained. DHC’s board suggested 
a few interested buyers who came to visit Abigo in Gothenburg, but Jan and 
Leif did not think anyone was good enough. Instead they started to discuss the 
opportunity for them to actually buy DHC. After all, they knew DHC, its 
business, and personnel. Further, DHC’s sales were high in Denmark. More 
importantly however, Jan and Leif had earlier noticed an opportunity to 
develop and further increase the business in Denmark. A few weeks later, 
Abigo bought DHC and today that opportunity has been realised. DHC’s 
turnover has increased from 5 to 25 million SEK since Abigo acquired it.  
 
The relationship between DHC and Abigo had, prior to the acquisition, been 
between Henrik and what he, according to Jan and Leif, called “his Swedish 
brothers” (Jan and Leif). Jan and Leif characterised it as a good business 
relationship. The geographic distance was too long for friendship to develop. 
The relationship nonetheless developed and strengthened over time; “trust was 
crucial”, explained Jan. “However”, Jan continued, “it was also important that DHC 
was successful with Abigo’s products, without that fact the situation would have looked 
different”. When discussing the relationship Jan and Leif reminisced and mean; 
“I think it worked because we had the same approach and general philosophies, even more so 
after a while. Of course there are always things that differed and that we wanted to change, 
but it wasn’t ours to change”. It was directly after the acquisition that such things 
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were actually changed. Jan and Leif also think they learned something about 
Denmark and the Danish approach. Even though it seems like Henrik, Jan, and 
Leif had a close relationship, the other employees at this time regarded Jan and 
Leif as just any other client; “but we did think they where nice guys”, Annegrethe 
commented, “but then all our clients were”. Lars and Annegrethe agreed they did 
not feel attached to Abigo prior to the acquisition; “all we did before was meet once 
a year or so for sales-meetings. After the acquisition a real and deep relationship was built as 
Jan and Leif went into the whole firm and today we have a very good relationship”, 
Annegrethe continues.   
 
“Without the relationship we would never have bought DHC, especially since an acquisition 
at that time was really outside our plan”, Jan said. “However, we knew them, they where 
good people and we felt a lot of trust – this was an opportunity we couldn’t miss”. Abigo 
was thus not looking for a firm to acquire.  
 
“The negotiation process was very quick and smooth, as it was a win-win situation”, Leif 
said. When discussing the evaluation process and price paid for DHC, both Jan 
and Leif believe they got a really good deal. This was based on a number of 
things. At that time, DHC owed Abigo quite a substantial amount of money, 
which gave Abigo a good starting point in the negotiation process. “However, 
more importantly we all knew each other and we could talk openly. The process was very 
informal as we already knew DHC, both its strengths and weaknesses, and thus the risks 
involved”, Jan and Leif continued. “We knew what we would have to deal with once an 
agreement was reached. Overall it was really an easy process, the evaluation and negotiation 
were both coloured by the fact that they wanted us to buy and we wanted to buy”, Jan ended.   
 
The announcement that Abigo acquired DHC was positive news for DHC and 
all theemployees felt relieved, as previously their future had been uncertain. 
“We were also happy Abigo was the buyer as we knew their products”, Lars said.  
 
Since the agreement was reached all involved agree that the relationship has 
positively evolved and developed. In fact, at DHC employees think it is only at 
this time that it can be considered a relationship, while Jan and Leif see the 
situation differently. But this has a natural explanation, as it was really with the 
former owner, Henrik, that Jan and Leif had their relationship. From their 
point of view, the positive picture and trust they had gained with DHC through 
Henrik never changed even though he passed away. Similarly, DHC’s 
RESULTS AND CASE-ANALYSIS 
 62
employees’ had known about the relationship between Henrik, Jan, and Leif 
and were happy to be acquired by Abigo. The relationship between the two 
firms is strong today, both from a business and personal point of view, 
according to Jan and Leif as well as Annegrethe and Lars.  
 
Functionally, there is good cooperation between the mother- and sister-firm 
today. There has been a low level of integration, as Jan and Leif do not think 
they have anything to win from interfering in DHC’s daily business – “they know 
their products and their market and should therefore be the ones to run the daily business. 
The only real daily difference is the financial reports we send to Abigo once a month and that 
we discuss problems with them”, Lars points out. “But then of course they are involved in 
budget and target setting” he reflects “and we need their approval on new products and 
contracts”. This daily independence is appreciated at DHC. However, it is very 
clear that Jan and Leif have full insight and the final say in all important 
decisions. “We handle external conflicts, business agreements, export issues, and other 
strategically important issues for DHC”, Jan says. Further, Jan explained that the two 
firms also utilise each other’s networks and share knowledge, even though this 
is currently mostly from Abigo to DHC. For example Abigo holds important 
product knowledge, which is transferred to DHC. “Abigo holds much important 
knowledge, like strategic, internationalisation and also other knowledge” Jan continues. 
“Of course we want to share this and our extensive network with DHC, we own DHC. The 
previous relationship has really helped in these matters; we have always known that Jan and 
Leif think we are good. We are good at selling their products, so we get investment back and 
that is really important”, Annegrethe remarks.  
 
There is also socialising between the firms, for example, they have Christmas 
dinner together every year, every other year in Denmark and Sweden. These 
social events also bring a cultural understanding, both Abigo and DHC learn 
about the Swedish/Danish as well as the Abigo/DHC culture and traditions. In 
fact, Jan and Leif believe this learning began during the previous relationship, 
but at that time they mostly learned about DHC corporate and management 
culture through the former owner. Further, Jan and Leif think such 
understanding, gained through the previous relationship, surely helped in the 
whole acquisition process. “Maybe it has also helped in the integration specifically, but 
then without the relationship there wouldn’t have been an acquisition and then no 
integration”, Leif laughs. Annegrethe also thinks she learned from the previous 
relationship but more in general terms; “you always do from collaborations”. 
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However, it is important to point out is that she did not think she learned 
anything about Abigo’s culture before they were acquired. As the relationship 
has developed Jan and Leif hope they have transferred some of their business 
philosophy of always taking a long-term perspective and aiming for stable 
development. In this manner they seek to create a kind of a common culture at 
the same time as having independent corporate cultures at DHC and Abigo.   
6.1.1 Analysis 
─ Nature of the pre-M&A relationship 
During the time span of the distribution agreement, the scope and width of the 
cooperation never changed. Nonetheless, the relationship evolved and 
deepened. To start, the firms over time became dependent upon each other. 
DHC was successful with Abigo’s products which constituted the core of their 
business. Equally, Abigo’s profit was dependent on DHC’s sales. This 
dependency is likely to have resulted in motivation to further invest in the 
relationship. This enabled strong social capital to develop. This will be 
elaborated below. Further, the initial relationship between Jan, Leif, and Henrik 
created opportunities for learning. The people directly involved learned mainly 
about each other’s business philosophies and management cultures. In fact, the 
firms in this aspect also adapted to each other over time, as seen in the case. To 
our knowledge, adaptation has mostly been discussed in the sense of practical 
adaptation. Here, it seems like “softer” adaptation is also likely to be a result of 
social relations in business relationships. 
 
The relational social capital that developed from the relationships between Jan, 
Leif, and Henrik was characterised by trust, respect, and something that could 
be called personal chemistry. The matching personal chemistry and their similar 
opinions on how to run a business seemed to create trust and respect. 
Interestingly, these feelings arose right from the start of the relationship and 
formed the basis for Jan and Leif’s decision to initiate a relationship in the form 
of a distribution agreement with DHC. Hence, rather than develop over time, 
the content of the relationship formed instantly resulting in the agreement 
reached. In fact, DHC was favoured over both larger and better firms for this 
reason. Hence from the very beginning, trust and a mutual fondness was seen 
as an important platform to build a long-term relationship from. Further 
illustrating the significance of trust in this relationship was the fact that the 
parties never signed a written contract regarding the agreement and referred to 
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each other as brothers. With the dependency and subsequent investments into 
the relationship, the relational social capital also deepened and strengthened.   
 
The direct links between the two companies were limited during the pre-M&A 
relationship, as it involved management only. Hence, the chance of direct 
employee interaction was also restricted. However, employees seem to have 
been indirectly affected by the relationship. If anything, it appears as though 
employees at DHC developed a positive initial perception about Abigo. This is 
likely to have been based on Abigo’s products and the problem free work-
routines between the companies. Evidence for this argument is the first 
reaction from DHC’s employees when Abigo acquired them. It was a feeling of 
relief, which may partly have arisen since they knew Abigo’s products and felt 
comfortable working with them. Even more important however, was the fact 
that they would not lose their jobs. It can thus be concluded that the previous 
relationship resulted in this positive picture without the need for 
social/personal links between people in the two firms. However, crucial to 
point out is that this positive perception is not the same as the trust Jan, Leif, 
and Henrik felt. This is interesting; the fact that DHC is a small firm makes one 
believe that trust created at management level would to some extent have 
diffused to the rest of the company. However, this was not the case, which 
implies that trust can not or is hard to transfer indirectly. 
 
─ Motive, need and idea 
The previous relationship gave Jan and Leif insight into DHC’s strengths and 
weaknesses and they saw potential for improvement and value creation. When 
Henrik unexpectedly and suddenly passed away, those potentials became a 
business opportunity and the motive behind their acquisition. Other factors 
were also important in this context, especially the dependency upon each other 
and the debt DHC had to Abigo. The fact that they knew both firms had been 
governed by similar management cultures also contributed to Jan and Leif’s 
assurance that the acquisition would not create major problems or destroy 
value for the firm. Hence, the previous relationship clearly had a large role in 
shaping the motive; however it was the profit opportunity which was the 
driving force. Without it, the acquisition would never have taken place – you do 
not do business only for the sake of affection. Trust of course also contributed 
in the way that it facilitated the insight, but without a functional relationship, 
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based on positive results leading to trust, the relationship is likely to have been 
terminated earlier. Thus, trust only indirectly contributes to the motive.   
 
Due to the circumstance of Henrik’s death, Jan and Leif got the opportunity to 
buy DHC. This was not something that had grown out of the relationship - if 
Henrik had not passed away, they would have never thought to acquire DHC. 
However, it can still be argued that the relationship was the foundation for the 
acquisition, since without it, Abigo would not have been aware of the 
opportunity. Especially since an acquisition was not even in Abigo’s strategy. 
Nonetheless, the surrounding circumstances were the triggering factor, not the 
relationship nor the good cooperation. Another point to consider here is that 
neither Jan nor Leif think the motive behind cooperation and M&As are the 
same, you cooperate for other reasons then you acquire. Thus, without the 
unfortunate circumstance Abigo would not have bought DHC, with or without 
a relationship. However, in line with Anderson et al (1994) the commitment to 
and hence the investments made into a relationship created the dependency, 
which drove and justified further commitment. 
 
─ Search and screening 
Search and screening did not occur; the acquisition grew out of a set of 
circumstances, as explained above. However, DHC’s search for a potential 
buyer was commissioned by the estate administrator. Abigo and DHC’s good 
relationship did have a role here, as they compared their own functional 
relationship to a new relationship they had to develop and invest in if someone 
else bought DHC. Thus, the existing relationship, the dependency, and the 
switching costs made Abigo reluctant to approve a new partner.  
 
─ Evaluation negotiations and the resulting agreement  
Evaluation and negotiation were alleviated by the previous relationship. Jan and 
Leif had, as mentioned, gained valuable knowledge about DHC. Thus, even 
though Henrik had passed away, openness and informality were present during 
the whole process, as well as a cooperative environment where information 
could easily be accessed and transmitted. Hence, in line with the Uppsala model 
(Johansson and Vahlne 1977), the pre-M&A relationship reduced the perceived 
risk. This, in turn facilitated the negotiation process. The fact that DHC owed 
Abigo money and that DHC really was in great need of an acquirer also 
contributed to the smoothness of the process. It gave Abigo a good position to 
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start from. The time spent on these processes was therefore limited. Further, 
Jan and Leif believe the relationship also meant they got a better price then they 
would have otherwise.  
 
─ Integration, adaptation and current cooperation 
The acquisition did not change the daily business at DHC, it seems like the 
previous relationship has just continued. However, integration has occurred as 
Jan and Leif are involved in major decision-making. It seems like the 
cooperation is good in these issues and that DHC has a lot to say in these 
decisions. This might be based on the relational social capital and the trust Jan 
and Leif have for DHC. It is also interesting that even though Henrik passed 
away, they still trust DHC and have never even thought of fully integrating 
DHC into Abigo. In this light, if no major synergistic benefits can be reached 
by integration, full integration is just an act to control uncertainties. This was 
not necessary here because trust based on knowledge was present instead.  
 
If DHC had not felt comfortable with Abigo, it is likely they would have 
distanced themselves and been suspicious when Abigo started to function as 
the new owner, making all major decisions. This in turn could have created a 
lot of problems and hostility between the two. The lessons learned from the 
previous relationship most likely contributed to the current good cooperation, 
even though employees at DHC did not feel they knew anything about Abigo’s 
culture. Abigo knew how Henrik had worked and could more or less just 
continue where he had left off. This gave employees at DHC the notion that 
Jan and Leif were competent and thus trust was reinforced. Jan and Leif’s 
approach also avoided a leadership vacuum, however this has nothing to do 
with the previous relationship. 
6.2 Case B: International corp. -Bioteknik AB  
International corp. was founded in the 1950s and is today an international firm 
based abroad that offers products and services for implant bone tooth 
replacement to professionals in dentistry. International corp. is a research 
focused firm that collaborates widely in R&D. By focusing on its core business, 
International corp. achieves growth and the firm will continue to invest in its 
expansions to make the most of potential marketing synergies. International 
corp. is convinced that in the future, more biotechnological procedures will be 
used for tooth replacement. Consequently, the company wishes to develop this 
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business area. The acquisition of the Swedish company Bioteknik AB, in 2003, 
was an important step in this direction (sources confidential). 
  
Bioteknik AB is a Bt firm active in the market of biological dental products. 
The company develops, manufactures, and markets its’ products to specialists 
in the field of periodontology and dentists treating periodontal diseases. Its’ 
main product, initiates formation of new supporting tissues, which means that 
it relies on the body’s own processes for healing and regeneration of oral 
tissues. Today the product is marketed in around 25 countries worldwide. 
Bioteknik AB was established in the 1980s. Their first employee was Denise, 
who is now the R&D manager. The CEO of Bioteknik AB is Anna, a former 
President of Bioteknik AB’s US sales-subsidiary. The head office, as well as the 
laboratory, is located in Sweden. At present there are ten researchers working in 
the laboratory and, in addition, Bioteknik AB is part of a large worldwide 
network of associates at universities which it relies on for various research 
projects (sources confidential). In the last ten years Bioteknik AB has struggled 
to survive and the acquisition was not really a surprise to anyone in the 
company. In fact, in the past Bioteknik AB had gone through many due 
diligence processes, since they had had a number of interested buyers. 
 
International corp. and Bioteknik AB came in contact for the first time in 2000, 
when the CEO’s of the two companies met, but this meeting did not lead to 
anything. However, in June 2002, the firms initiated a small research 
experiment together. The ultimate aim of this was to test the potential fit 
between Bioteknik AB’s and International corp.’s technologies, to see if 
Bioteknik AB’s main product could be used in conjunction with International 
corp.’s products. Practically, it was a rather simple project. Bioteknik AB sent 
its product to International corp. who then conducted the test while Bioteknik 
AB waited for the result. The people involved from International corp. were 
Bertil, the biologics division manager, and two persons from the university that 
International corp. cooperates with. From Bioteknik AB, it was mainly Denise 
who was involved, even though a few others had phone and mail contact with 
researchers at International corp. Denise and Bertil did meet in person, spoke 
frequently on the phone, and participated in the same conferences. The positive 
project result, which was ended before the acquisition agreement was reached, 
was in fact the foundation leading to the acquisition.  
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During this relationship people from Bioteknik AB and International corp.  got 
to know and appreciate each other. During this initial period Anna based her 
positive feelings for International corp. mainly on marketing material and what 
was said about International corp. in the marketplace; “their good reputation created 
a positive picture even before we met”, Anna said. International corp. and Bioteknik 
AB also partly shared a customer base, and Anna and Bertil agree that it was 
good to hear what their common customers thought of the other party, its 
products, and people. Bertil and Denise, who were both involved in the initial 
research project, also referenced this positive feeling to the initial R&D project. 
They learned they had similar philosophies and cultures. Both firms were 
research focused, European, and rather small companies but the ease with 
which they could talk to each other, common ideas on how to approach the 
market, and a dedication to R&D was just as important.  
 
International corp.’s acquisition of Bioteknik AB was a strategic move to gain 
access to Bioteknik AB’s biological division, as International corp. wanted to 
expand its own biologics division. As this was an important aim, the search and 
screening was long and thorough. However, International corp. did not have 
pre-set criteria for the perfect partner; instead Bertil compares it to how you 
would find a life-partner. “You don’t go selecting from party to party and think match 
and not match, instead, you more or less know the players in the field and then you consider 
your choices and things just fall in place or not.” Management at International corp. 
felt there was a “window of opportunity” and decided to bid for Bioteknik AB. 
When it fell into place it all went very fast. However, the fact that Bioteknik AB 
was located in Sweden was seen a negative aspect as “no one wants to go to Sweden 
voluntarily and people who heard it were concerned”, Bertil laughs. This is due, for 
example, to the image of the Swedish labour laws in Europe. 
 
The motive from Bioteknik AB’s side was also clear; they had had financial 
problems for quite some time and wanted to find a stable owner. It was a 
number of things that led Bioteknik AB to agree to be acquired by 
International corp. First of all, International corp.’s motive and strategic 
decision to develop their biological division was appealing as Bioteknik AB 
perfectly complemented International corp. here – they even had the previous 
research project to prove this fit. The acquisition of Bioteknik AB would 
provide International corp. with expertise in protein chemistry and production, 
sales and marketing knowledge within the biological area, and an immediate 
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entrance into the market. “This also meant the acquisition wouldn’t lead to layoffs at 
Bioteknik AB and my people are always my first concern”, Anna says. Bioteknik AB 
would instead gain additional resources to continue their development and 
research, which could further push up sales. International corp. was not the 
only potential partner for Bioteknik AB at that time however. Bioteknik AB did 
due diligence for a number of other firms. “Due diligence is always carried out after 
the rules, but International corp. nevertheless stood out and impressed us”, Denise 
comments. Their management team, for example, came in person instead of 
the company sending consultants or external partners. In fact, even though 
another company offered Bioteknik AB a higher price, International corp. was 
chosen in the end. “We all liked International corp. because of the people and a sense of 
belonging”, said Anna. “It was not like a total stranger came in that we had never heard 
of”, she continued. “Feeling comfortable is important for the whole process and the result, 
you go in much more guarded otherwise.” 
 
The negotiation phase went unusually smooth. It was personal and 
straightforward and it involved the CEOs of both firms together with small 
teams from both sides. “A large number of investment bankers and consultants were thus 
avoided”, Anna says. Bioteknik AB’s bankers even said in retrospect that this 
seemed like the nicest acquisition they had ever seen. This was due to the fact 
that the two management teams got on extremely well. All in all, the 
negotiations lasted only four months and “it just did not happen that people were 
tricking each other, which otherwise always seems to happen”, said Bertil. The 
negotiations were characterised by openness and both parties clearly expressing 
what they wanted and how. “International corp. said from the beginning what the plan 
was and I have never doubted they wouldn’t do exactly what they said they would”, Anna 
explains. Similarly, Bioteknik AB did not try to hide anything. However, both 
Bertil and Anna point out that a little playing always takes place. Trust was also 
mentioned as being important for a smooth negotiation process; “the minute you 
have trust, everything else can be managed”, Anna commented. “If trust hadn’t been 
present we probably would have been secretive and reluctant to share”.  
 
Employees were not told about the deal until minutes before the press release. 
Anna announced the decision and let employees ask questions. As soon as 
possible she contacted the two largest subsidiaries as well as key customers and 
got on a plane to meet the employees and answer their questions face to face. 
“I think being there in person, so that they can see you, is important”, Anna says. 
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Nevertheless, Denise reveals that many employees feel they did not receive 
enough information about the acquisition and still have not. However, this has 
not led to any serious consequences so far. 
 
The first reactions among the employees at Bioteknik AB were: “will I lose my 
job, will International corp. shut us down, and will we disappear?”, Anna explains. The 
same feelings were actually noticeable in International corp., even though they 
were the acquirers. These feelings of uncertainty and not knowing what is going 
on usually create dissatisfaction. However, once employees at Bioteknik AB 
learned about the situation and the motive behind the acquisition, and 
especially now as they have started to realise that initial promises will be kept, 
the uncertainty has vanished. Now there might actually be a need for new 
recruitments and employees feel comfortable again. At Bioteknik AB the most 
positive reactions are found within R&D and production, since in R&D they 
have already started to develop new products and in production they see 
possibilities for an increased workload. Hence, the increase in resources and 
rising opportunities have created a positive atmosphere within these 
departments. In addition, Denise viewed International corp. as the best 
candidate, based on her initial contact with Bertil and experiences from the 
experiment. This caused her to portray confidence in International corp., which 
also made people within R&D satisfied. Clara compares the happy situation at 
Bioteknik AB to colleagues at Pharmacia, where acquisitions have been far 
from painless. Apart from the initial worry at International corp.’s biologics 
division, the deal has been well received. Bertil even had an example of an 
employee that came up to him and said: “I’d love to tell you that this was a good 
deal”. 
 
Innovative capacity, one of the most crucial aspects within this industry, was 
also affected by the acquisition. Initially, when the employees started to 
consider the new situation and regulatory aspects had to be revised, it all 
stopped, Denise explained. However, shortly after that the capacity was 
enhanced by the fact that Bioteknik AB got new angles and inputs and that 
more people got involved. There was also a positive attitude among the 
researchers from the start, due to the successful result of the experiment. 
Denise believes this shortened the “slow-down” period. Nonetheless, some 
projects and patents that were considered to be outside International corp.’s 
focus had to be terminated. “These might very well be good ideas and opportunities, but 
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it is time for someone else to take care of them”, Denise says “and even though it is a bit 
sad for the people involved, they are used to such things happening all the time”. Finally, 
Bioteknik AB will still be able to continue with its world-wide cooperation and 
especially its EU-projects, which were initially questioned. This cooperation has 
been important for Bioteknik AB and still is since it enables the company to 
conduct more research than they otherwise could have done. Denise also 
explained that this cooperation has influenced the R&D department’s view of 
being acquired in a positive way. 
 
Even though the attitude towards International corp. is positive, the issue of 
being acquired as such has not been appealing to Bioteknik AB for natural 
reasons, and Denise refers to it as a mourning period. People that have been 
with Bioteknik AB for a long time felt a bit sad, since they had been owners 
and gone through many hard struggles together to keep the company alive. 
“What was previously our life is now in the hands of someone else and we can’t influence 
decisions regarding the future development any more”, Denise explains. However, new 
employees do not seem to care in the same way, in some cases they might feel 
the opposite. International corp. is then seen as a strong and stable owner with 
resources to invest in Bioteknik AB.  
 
Right after the deal was completed, a number of integration teams, with 
employees from both International corp. and Bioteknik AB, were formed. 
These teams have now completed their tasks and the company has thus moved 
on to real functional project groups. The integration strategy is to bring 
Bioteknik AB 100% into International corp.’s biological division. At the time of 
the acquisition, International corp. only had a tiny biological R&D department 
with five employees, and they did not even have a proper laboratory. Hence, 
with the acquisition of Bioteknik AB, International corp. is practically starting 
its biological department and there will be two R&D sites, one in Sweden and 
one abroad. Projects will be carried out with project managers from both 
countries. The foreign department will concentrate on bone and implants and 
Bioteknik AB on periodontology. However, due to Bioteknik AB’s larger 
resources and techniques the Swedish site (Bioteknik AB) will, regardless of the 
type of project and manager, have a central role. Denise explained that this 
international cooperative working routine is perfectly normal within this 
industry and this is how research is conducted worldwide.  
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For Bioteknik AB’s part, the integration with International corp. also involves 
changing corporate design and guidelines, packaging, marketing material, and 
boxes. Further, the name Bioteknik AB will disappear but the product brand 
will be kept. Anna does not believe however that their customers will react 
poorly, since they identify with the brand, not the company name. Regarding 
the market, Bioteknik AB’s products will have a special sales force in larger 
markets, while in smaller markets there will be a special product manager. Right 
now, Bioteknik AB is in the process of coordinating its distribution with 
International corp.’s, Bioteknik AB has distributors in around 20 countries and 
International corp. has 14 subsidiaries and another 20 distributors. The aim is 
to have one sales point in every market.  
 
International corp. will further apply a so-called global strategy throughout its 
organisation, which means that each individual department in Sweden will 
report to its corresponding department abroad. Denise personally feels a bit 
suspicious towards this strategy and ironically suggests; “it must have been an idea 
coming from some consultants”. At Bioteknik AB, the CEO, CFO, information 
manager, and R&D positions will disappear. People at Bioteknik AB will thus 
lose the persons they used to look up to, discuss issues with, or just 
communicate with on general issues. However, Denise does not believe it will 
pose a problem within the R&D department, since they are already used to 
working internationally. 
 
After the acquisition-decision was announced, there have been a few meetings 
where management from International corp. visited the Swedish site, as well as 
some social events in Sweden. “In this way”, Denise explains, “people at Bioteknik 
AB have seen what the people at International corp. really look like, how they act and sound, 
something that is surely seen as comforting”. The first impression was good and 
people thought that International corp. seemed nice. The Swedes have not 
visited International corp.’s headquarters to the same extent yet, but as the 
process has not ended there will be more combined R&D and management 
meetings in the future so that everybody will hear about the different research 
projects. Anna says that management philosophy today is about people working 
in teams, that is why it is important to socialise in a relaxed environment. She 
feels it is especially important because of the distance between the two sites. 
“When the employees have had the chance to get to know each other on another level, they will 
have a lot easier time picking up the phone to ask a question”, she continues. “Then you 
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send your e-mail to a face, not to cyber space…it is all about the people, if people do not 
communicate, nothing will happen”. According to Bertil, the global strategy is part of 
the aim to get employees from both companies to feel part of one team. This 
goal has not yet been reached however. Employees both at International corp. 
and Bioteknik AB still feel like “we and them”. In fact, it might be difficult to 
get employees to truly feel like “we”, especially at HQ were there often is talk 
about “we centrally” and “the others out in the subs”, whereas people out in 
subsidiaries are more prone to identify with a corporate “we”.  
 
Talking about cultural integration, Bertil explains; “I believe that culture is 
important, but that it cannot be changed because it is deeply rooted in individuals and 
society”. The only solution, as he sees it, is to find a culturally compatible 
partner. In this respect, he feels Bioteknik AB and International corp. are a 
good match, mostly due to the fact that International corp. is culturally similar 
to the Swedes in many aspects. Further, he also believes that people from his 
country are used to working with other cultures as they have many cultures in 
the same country. In addition, both countries are small countries. He ends with 
a smile and explains that International corp. does not have room for cultural 
clashes and stubborn employees that negatively affect the business and 
innovative capacity. “Fire them all”, laughs Anna, when asked what would 
happen if negative stress occurs among the employees as a result of cultural 
issues. The reason why Bertil and Anna do not seem to take the question of 
cultural integration and possible negative consequences seriously, might be that 
there have been no major cultural clashes neither with respect to corporate 
culture nor regarding national culture. Bertil further believes that it would not 
serve their purpose to try to reshape Bioteknik AB to be like International 
corp., nor strive for the same culture worldwide, since International corp. 
believes local adaptation is vital.  
 
In the context of cultural differences and similarities, it is also interesting to 
note that there seems to be an international research-culture, which might also 
contribute to the absence of cultural clashes and negative emotions among the 
employees in this case. International corp.’s research team within biologics is a 
good example of the international culture characterising R&D. The team 
consists of five researchers and together they represent four different 
nationalities. This means that even though International corp. as a whole might 
have a certain corporate culture and is influenced by its national culture, this 
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research group is not heavily affected by it. Instead, the cooperation with the 
Swedish research team is perfectly normal to them and reflects their daily work. 
This is further emphasised by Denise who mentioned that the fact that Bertil 
was a researcher made her feel more confident and positive towards 
International corp. This might further ease the cooperation and integration 
between the companies in the future, as it is within R&D that the closest 
cooperation will take place. However, this also implies that researchers involved 
in the initial experiment did not learn much about each others specific 
corporate and national cultures.  
 
The acquisition has so far lived up to the expectations held by both 
International corp. and Bioteknik AB. It is too early however to definitely 
evaluate the outcome, this will first be possible in a year and a half. Bertil 
admits that there is a lot left before the acquisition can be regarded as 
successful. There might very well arise problems in the future; “when the first 
shipment does not make it”, Bertil puts in. “However, we have many things on our side”, 
he reflects. Talking about the success of this acquisition, Denise believes the 
most critical aspect is that Bioteknik AB and International corp. complement 
each other so well; “and I really hope International corp. will take care of and develops 
Bioteknik AB’s products”. 
 
It can thus be said that so far, this acquisition seems to have a happy ending. 
Bertil says that the whole operation has gone smooth and there have been no 
major conflicts. Anna explains that Bioteknik AB has been extremely fortunate 
to be acquired by International corp. and that such happy marriages are 
uncommon. In many cases, a whole pipeline or specific technology is acquired 
as it is, while in the case of Bioteknik AB and International corp., there was a 
potential to develop the two technologies individually and also to merge the 
two technologies. According to Denise, the largest problem overall has been 
the situation facing Bioteknik AB’s marketing subsidiaries in Europe, where 
rationalisation is necessary. The employees affected will be offered to move to 
International corp.’s office, but since it involves long-distance movement, not 
all are prepared to accept the offer.  
 
Conclusively, as indicated, views differed regarding the role and importance of 
the experiment in the subsequent M&A process. While Denise said that the 
initial cooperation developed into the current cooperation within biologics, 
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which also was the motive behind the acquisition, Anna did not even consider 
it important. Denise explained it in the following way: “some kind of initial positive 
foundation to build from developed from the times we met and talked to each other”. She 
shared this view with Bertil, who expressed it as: “The project was like a first date”. 
Overall, the initial experiment seems to have mattered to International corp., as 
they noticed afterwards that there was a good combination of technologies and 
started to think about how an integration of the two departments would work 
out. The previous relation also enabled Denise to look more closely at, and 
examine, International corp.’s technique before the deal was signed. She got to 
see what their product was based on and which patents they had and this would 
not have been possible otherwise. She also believes that a previous relation 
makes it possible to move faster in the beginning of the M&A process; “as you 
can run faster when you know each other”. In short, International corp. to some 
extent knew what they bought and Bioteknik AB knew what they got, hence 
the surprises are lessened. 
 
As we had the opportunity to partly hold the interviews with Anna and Bertil  
together, we got to experience the atmosphere in the room and it hit us that it 
actually was as relaxed and positive as described. They both laughed a lot 
together and in the end they even joked about holding seminars together about 
how to make your M&A successful. 
6.2.1 Analysis 
─ Nature of the pre-M&A relationship 
The relationship was initiated when the research project started. It only directly 
involved Denise, Bertil, and the background researchers which meant that 
opportunities for direct interaction and social connections were not 
corporation-wide. During this initial period Denise and Bertil had contact and 
occasionally met outside both firms, e.g. in conferences they both attended. 
This gave them a chance to interact and shape an opinion of each other in an 
outside and neutral environment. There they could discuss the progress of the 
project, but also other general work-related issues. Through each other, they 
learned Bioteknik AB and International corp. had similar corporate cultures, in 
which R&D was the main focus. R&D was also Denise and Bertil’s common 
background and interest. This is also likely to have facilitated the interaction 
and connection found between them. However, it is important to point out 
that trust was not a characteristic of the pre-M&A relationship, nor was there a 
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personal level of the relationship. Nevertheless, a positive atmosphere formed 
between them and their firms, without which the research project would have 
been harder to achieve.  
 
─ Motive, need and idea 
The motives from both parts were very clear and not a result of the pre-
acquisition relationship. Earlier International corp. had taken a strategic 
decision to develop its biological division. Bioteknik AB needed resources to 
continue their business. The motives existed even before the research 
experiment and relationship between the firms was initiated. The motives 
nevertheless proved to be important in later stages, even though not a result of 
the pre-M&A relationship. 
 
─ Search and screening 
Bioteknik AB had several acquisition offers and the power to choose who was 
going to be the acquirer of the firm. However, the previous relationship 
influenced their search and screening process. Bioteknik AB paid attention to 
the pre-acquisition relationship in their decision to let International corp. buy 
Bioteknik AB. The positive research result and the positive picture they had of 
International corp. were important.   
 
Without positive results on the initial research project it is highly unlikely that 
International corp. would have pursued this acquisition. The technical fit was 
thus essential and the underlying motive for International corp. However, 
Bioteknik AB had a number of offers and it is likely also that these companies 
had tried the technical fit between Bioteknik AB’s and their own technique. 
This is possible and very simple. Bioteknik AB, contradictory too many other 
Bt firms, actually has a product on the market. Hence, the product could be 
purchased by any company and tried with their techniques. However, other 
aspects were also influential.  
 
To start, from Anna’s point of view she formed her positive picture of 
Bioteknik AB from recommendations and opinions from Bioteknik AB’s and 
International corp.’s common customers to a large extent. This is interesting, 
since it indicates that the companies, to some extent, were embedded in the 
same network even before they had been in direct contact with each other. 
Thus, the shared embeddedness at an early phase affected the M&A process 
RESULTS AND CASE-ANALYSIS 
 77
positively. This was a result of the fact that they were active within the same 
area of Bt, not the pre-acquisition relationship. Anna also put weight on 
International corp.’s goals and strategies used to reach these. She analysed this 
partly from what they had already done, from marketing material and other 
material available in the market, but also from the times she met with 
International corp. The positive feeling she had before she actually met them 
was then confirmed and reinforced when they did so. She liked International 
corp. and their culture, they connected and a sense of being on the same level 
was formed.  
 
For Denise and Bertil this positive attitude was also based on the interactions 
during the initial research project. The very fact that they pursued such an 
experiment revealed International corp.’s research focus and future strategy for 
Bioteknik AB. One speculation is that Denise especially could have been more 
reluctant to be open and positive towards International corp. She is Bioteknik 
AB’s first employee and very attached to Bioteknik AB, she has been through 
all the ups and downs and survived them all – in many eyes she is Bioteknik AB 
– and the thought of an acquisition was of course upsetting for her. However, 
she had the opportunity to form her own opinion in a neutral setting where 
pressures and stresses were absent.  
 
Further, the positive result of the research experiment seems to have opened 
International corp.’s eyes for the specific opportunity to acquire Bioteknik AB. 
In the same way, the initial cooperation seems to have made Bioteknik AB 
realise what a suitable partner International corp. would be. Hence, the research 
project can be seen as a visualisation of the opportunity. Put in another way, it 
can also be said that the pre-M&A relationship made the companies realise 
opportunities for future value creation. These opportunities together with the 
mutual appreciation most likely influenced the final decision to merge. 
Bioteknik AB actually turned another company down even though they were 
offered a higher price. Bioteknik AB thus monetarily valued the corporate and 
technical fit, revealed through the pre-M&A relationship, to the extent that they 
accepted a lower price to be sure the new owner was one that they felt 
comfortable with.  
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─ Evaluation negotiations and the resulting agreement  
The negotiations were characterised by openness and smoothness, which 
resulted in a short process. International corp.’s motive to develop their 
biological department, meaning Bioteknik AB was reassured the company 
would be taken care of and developed, clearly contributed to this atmosphere. 
Thus, the previous relationship did not have the primary role. Nevertheless, 
what was created in the previous relation meant Bioteknik AB knew 
International corp.’s motive was honest and sound. Thus, the fact that they got 
on and had a positive picture of each other surely also alleviated the processes. 
Bioteknik AB and International corp. were both there due to a conscious 
decision that they wanted each other. It is important to point out that the price 
Bioteknik AB received was not the determining factor leading to the choice of 
International corp., which further strengthens the above reasoning. The 
companies’ sound attitude towards the negotiation process, working with small 
teams and few consultants also eased the process, which should not be 
forgotten. 
 
The pre-M&A research experiment in this case could be compared to early 
dating. A positive aspect of the pre-M&A relationship then is that the 
companies have already started to become familiar with each other when they 
merge. This shortens the M&A process, at least in the beginning, as seen by the 
short negotiations in this case. 
 
─ Integration, adaptation and current cooperation 
Interestingly, the positive feelings management had towards International corp. 
did not prevent initial anxiety among employees in both companies when the 
deal was announced. This anxiety also affected the innovative capacity, as 
everything slowed down for a while. However, it did help in that this anxiety 
was very quickly overcome and transformed into confidence. Denise played an 
important role here. It was important that employees experienced that promises 
were kept. International corp. has thus succeeded with communicating its 
intentions during the M&A process.  
 
The pre-M&A relationship is argued to, via Denise, has influenced employee 
attitudes within R&D. Her positive attitude and confidence in International 
corp. - she who knew all alternatives and was always striving for the best of 
Bioteknik AB - transferred the faith to the employees in that department. This 
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is an interesting indication of transferability of positive attitude developed as a 
result of the pre-M&A relationship, as well as of the importance of key persons 
for such a transfer to occur. The reason employees feel comfortable with 
International corp. is thus twofold.  
 
The integration has not been affected by the previous relationship to a major 
extent. International corp. always aimed for full integration, but the initial 
project did prove this was technically beneficial however. In this way a costly 
trial was avoided and management knew the initial justification would hold also 
after the agreement was reached. Determinism was thus avoided. Further, the 
common embeddedness also mattered for the integration of sales subsidiaries 
as common customers will ease and create synergies here.  
 
In Bioteknik AB, we believe the positive attitude of Anna and Denise has had 
positive influence on employees. Specifically Denise, as she stands for a lot of 
continuation and Bioteknik AB’s other values. The fact that Denise and Anna 
are leaving Bioteknik AB is however sending double messages, which could 
confuse employees and ultimately trust can be broken down. If it is so great, 
why are they leaving? This could in turn have serious repercussions, as 
discussed in the theoretical chapter. Loss of solidarity, unwillingness to work 
towards common goals and cooperate as well as loss of innovative capacity are 
a few examples. Loss of key employees and management is a common 
phenomenon in M&A and it often has larger long-term negative effects, which 
are often foreseen by the acquiring firm. This is a potential future risk that 
International corp. should be aware of. 
 
The motive behind the acquisition was from International corp.’s side to gain 
access to Bioteknik AB’s R&D, techniques, products and overall know-how. 
The integration within this area has so far gone smooth. However, we believe 
this might be the result of a global research community, with a language and 
culture of its own. The question is thus how many problems may actually arise 
when integrating R&D departments. The fact that there is large technical and 
complementary potential between International corp. and Bioteknik AB is also 
likely to have contributed to the smoothness. It increased the motivation of 
employees, thereby contributing to value creation in the M&A process. 
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The fact that a “we-versus-them feeling” is still present among employees 
illustrates that the research experiment did not create a common identity. In 
fact, it could actually be a sign of hidden hostility among the employees at 
Bioteknik AB, even though everything appears fine on the surface.  
6.3 Case C: Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan AB  
Wilh.Sonesson is a Swedish company that produces, distributes, markets, and 
sells products that improves people’s health and well-being. Products include 
non-prescription and naturopathic medicines, nutritional supplements, vitamins 
and minerals, as well as registered pharmaceutical dermatological products. The 
company is foremost marketing focused and develops and sells strong brands 
in the Nordic consumer healthcare market. Production and distribution are 
complementary activities which create synergies and give Wilh.Sonesson a 
critical size. With its turnover of about 700 MSEK the company is among the 
larger actors in the market. At present, Sweden is Wilh.Sonesson’s main market 
but the firm is striving to become the leading consumer healthcare company in 
the Nordic market (www.wilhsonesson.com).  
 
Bioglan was founded by independent scientists in 1984. In 1987 the start up 
was sold to a Norwegian firm, which was acquired by the British company 
Bioglan, in 1994. The British parent company went into administration in 2002 
and left Bioglan AB to find its own destiny. In May 2002 the company was split 
and the R&D unit was sold to the British corporation SkyePharma and then the 
remaining two parts (marketing and production) were acquired by 
Wilh.Sonesson. Thus today Bioglan consists of two companies. The first, 
Bioglan Nordic Market, markets and sells pharmaceuticals in the Nordic 
countries, foremost dermatological and pain-relief products. The second firm is 
Bioglan AB, which is the contract pharmaceutical manufacturing division of 
Wilh. Sonesson AB located in Malmö, Sweden. This company is specialised on 
contract manufacture of pharmaceutical semi-solid formulations for topical use 
and produces for Bioglan Nordic Market, Wilh.Sonesson, and around 30 other 
pharmaceutical companies in Europe, Asia, and the USA 
(www.wilhsonesson.com).  
 
At the time of the acquisition, in 2002, Totte Malmström was (and still is) 
Bioglan’s CEO. When the bankruptcy in the parent company was a fact, Totte 
considered many options for Bioglan, but selling seemed like the most suitable 
option at that time. For this reason Totte contacted a number of people in the 
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industry. As he had just weeks previously met Bo Håkansson (CEO of 
Wilh.Sonesson) he thought it worth while to also contact him. Bo and Totte at 
that time had no personal relationship, but Totte knew who Bo was and they 
had met a few times professionally. “I just phoned Bo and said here you have a great 
chance”, Totte says. Wilh.Sonesson at that time had not been planning to acquire 
a company and was thus not searching or screening the market. They had no 
criteria for a coming acquisition. “We just got a phone call and with that a great 
opportunity which we couldn’t miss, their products complemented ours”, Lennart Molvin 
remembers. “Bo was fast to respond and we liked each other, and from there it just rolled 
on”, Totte continues. “It is really like dating, you go out, have a good time, have dinner 
and then after a while you marry. It was also suitable since we were really glad to find a good 
Swedish buyer, we had worked for a British and Norwegian owner and were fed up with the 
cultural issues. All in all, as most things in business, it was just a set of circumstance”, 
Totte ends.  
 
The evaluation and negotiation process was problem free in this case. The 
evaluation was very limited, Totte believes the acquisition was based more on 
personal chemistry and feeling than anything else, even though the two firms 
did not have a prior relationship. This personal aspect or connection is crucial, 
however Totte also thinks it only matters until the doors are opened, which in 
this case they were by Bo, after that it is all professional. The evaluation was 
therefore carried out by Wilh.Sonesson’s CFO and was not at all influenced by 
the connection between Bo and Totte. Equally the negotiations were handled 
by lawyers and administrators in London. However, Lennart believes this 
process would have been even quicker if the firms had collaborated before or 
had a business relationship of any kind. “Then you know the softer issues and you have 
a frame of reference and can therefore move faster. We didn´t have that and had to 
investigate”, Lennart says.   
 
Bioglan’s employees received the acquisition decision positively, as they were 
well aware of the bankruptcy and what could potentially have happened. In this 
aspect Wilh.Sonesson sees itself as Bioglan’s saviours, while Bioglan looks upon 
the situation in another light. Totte reveals that Bioglan were negotiating with 
other firms as well. 
 
There was one attempt to integrate the two firms, when Wilh.Sonesson tried to 
rationalise the organisation in October 2002. The aim then was to share 
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administrative, economic, and financial functions. Bioglan’s office staff was 
therefore moved to Lund. However, this was never successful as the firms were 
too different to achieve any synergistic effects. Further complicating the matter 
was that the major part of Bioglan’s staff and the production site was still in 
Malmö. Problems arose and the organisation is now again decentralising and 
Bioglan is moving back to its old site in Malmö. There was never an attempt to 
culturally integrate the two firms, as they are operating in different segments. 
Today Bioglan operates independently within Wilh.Sonesson and continues to 
report to and share its profit with Wilh.Sonesson.  
 
Conclusively, neither Totte nor Lennart think that it would have made any 
difference if the firms had cooperated before the acquisitions occurred. There 
would have still been an attempt to consolidate operations. “However”, Totte 
speculates, “maybe it would in fact be harder to stay professional in hard and difficult 
situations, when business is bad etc, maybe a personal relationship could limit professionalism. 
Without a personal relationship”, Totte continues, “it is easier to deal with it and then 
move on and continue to work”.  
6.3.1 Analysis 
─ Nature of the pre-M&A relationship 
In this acquisition, the firms involved had not previously worked or 
cooperated. They did not have a pre-M&A relationship and thus social capital 
did not exist in advance between the firms. This was also the reason why this 
case was included. Personal chemistry nonetheless turned out to be influential.    
 
─ Motive, search and screening 
Bioglan’s motive was clearly survival and they were actively searching for an 
acquisition partner. The CEO used his personal network and references in the 
marketplace to identify a partner. As such, Totte approached Wilh.Sonesson 
with an opportunity they would otherwise have missed, especially since they 
were not even searching for a company to acquire. This illustrates the benefits 
of networking and being known within an industry niche. Totte did not have 
pre-set criteria; instead he “fished around in known waters”. As it happened, 
Bo was quickest to respond, they met a few times and liked each other. These 
first meetings are thus important before proceeding with the acquisition, since 
they reveal if there is a good personal match. Feelings and opinions about each 
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other’s business approaches are established and evaluated, as well as reviewing 
complementary products between the two. 
 
It can thus be concluded that even though social capital was not present at the 
time of the acquisition, parts involved were looking for a good business 
opportunity to build their future business relationship on. Parts involved had 
their own idea of what criteria are important for this, even though it is not 
outspoken or written down.  
 
─ Evaluation negotiations and the resulting agreement  
Wilh.Sonesson liked Bioglan since their products complemented each other 
and they saw future potential with the acquisition. Indirectly, this seems to have 
developed into trust and a feeling that the personal chemistry was right, since 
this is what really turned out to matter in the evaluation process. The evaluation 
was limited and conducted on a “gut-feeling”.  
  
The negotiation was carried out by consultants and Bioglan’s trustee and was 
strictly professional. This was suitable, the process was quick and smooth, and 
no major problems arose.  
 
─ Integration, adaptation and current cooperation 
The employees were relieved by the acquisition message, since their job and 
security had been threatened. Hence, a pre-M&A relationship is not very likely 
to have contributed further to this positive response.  
 
Integration was, in this case, attempted but failed due to the lack of synergies 
and practical market overlaps. Both managers involved believe and maintain 
that this situation would not have looked different even though the firms had 
cooperated before the acquisition-integration was attempted. However, we 
believe the insight and open communication needed to avoid this is exactly 
what a previous relationship could give. If firms had previously attempted to 
collaborate, they might have detected there was a lack of required overlaps to 
make integration economically rational. At least they might have discussed the 
issue before just trying it. In a pre-M&A situation this would have been fast and 
relatively cheap. Now, decision-makers were instead blinded by their initial 
justification of the acquisition, which partly was to reach synergistic effects. 
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This has proven to be a pitfall in M&As and also a common phenomenon 
leading to problems and value destruction. 
 
The fact that everything, except the failure within rationalisation, has run 
smoothly after the deal was signed is probably due to the fact that practically no 
integration of the companies is seen as desirable or has been made.   
 
Interestingly, it was thought that a pre-M&A relationship would have had the 
potential to speed up the whole process even more. This opinion was based on 
a belief that the parties then are likely to know, right from the start, what they 
are going into, which will make things easier.  
6.4 Case D: Active Skattekonsult AB-Nederman Nordic AB  
Nederman Nordic AB (Nederman) was founded by Philip Nederman in 1944 
and was from the start a metal-plating firm, but later developed into working 
with ventilation systems. Today Nederman works with various products aimed 
to improve the production environment for other companies. It produces and 
sells products that e.g. improve ventilation, sound levels, pressure and lighting 
(www.nederman.com).  
  
In the beginning Nederman was a small successful family-firm and when Philip 
Nederman passed away, his son Bill took over the company. In 1980 the firm 
had grown and Acke Nyberg was hired as marketing director and Lars-Erik 
Andersson as CEO. At about this time the company also engaged an external 
tax-consultant, Bo Håkansson (owner and spirit of Active Skattekonsult AB). 
Bo came to help Nederman in many financial-related aspects, not only tax 
issues. For example he handled Nederman’s introduction to the stock exchange 
(then the OTC-list) as well as structuring Bill’s personal economy. Bo had full 
insight into Nederman’s economic situation and Bill, Acke, Lars-Erik, and Bo 
developed a strong business relationship and they became friends. 
 
After the introduction to the stock exchange, Nederman had a couple of joint-
owners but the situation became unstable. At that time, in 1985, Bill was 
starting to feel the weight of responsibility that the company meant and he was 
worried he would go the same way as his father, who had died of a heart attack, 
if he continued. Bo, who knew everything about Nederman, its economy, its 
employees and the “jävlar-anamma” culture, stepped in and offered to buy 
Nederman.  
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In 1991, Active had financial cash-flow problems, due to reasons other than 
Nederman, which was performing positively. Nevertheless, Active had to sell 
one of its sister-firms and Nederman was an attractive company that they could 
make a good profit from. Nederman was thus sold off to Esab. Active was sure 
that Nederman would be taken care of at Esab.  
 
The relationship between the people at Active and Nederman has been 
characterised as a deep business relationship founded on professionalism; “after 
all Bo was hired for money”, Lars-Erik says. However, all involved also spoke about 
the extra personal level of the relationship, which in this case seems to have 
been extensive. It even happened that families met and wives and children were 
brought along while the others (Bill, Acke, Lars-Erik and Bo and Lennart) were 
working. The relationship was imprinted by Bill and Bo’s fun, creative and 
dynamic personalities; “and when these two were together we could do anything”, Acke 
comments. They were always open, had a lot of respect and trust for each 
other, which spread to all employees. “Basically the personal chemistry fit”, Acke 
ends.      
 
Active did not have the intention to buy Nederman when the relationship 
started. Bo and Lennart did however learn a lot about Nederman over the 
years, both its positive and negative aspects, and thought Nederman was an 
exciting company. Active became an important part of Nederman and affected 
its development; “Active strengthened and gave Nederman an extra push”, Lars-Erik 
means. “The motive behind Active’s acquisition of Nederman instead grew from the 
relationship between two individuals with a large respect for each other”, Lars-Erik said. Bo 
knew everything about Nederman and was welcomed. Bo helped Bill in a 
situation where he wanted to sell but still be sure of the future of his father’s 
company. “It is important to point out here that Bo’s number one motive was still the 
opportunity to make a profit”, both Acke and Lars-Erik commented.    
 
Evaluation and negotiations were never formally conducted in this case, it was 
not necessary; evaluation had been done throughout the whole relationship. 
“Bo knew everything and there was thus no risk”, Acke explained. However, Lars-Erik 
sees it differently and points to the risk of this; “Bo evaluated with his heart not his 
head, it could have been risky”. The idea of the acquisition evolved from Bills wish 
to sell the company and the two discussed it informally. Everyone involved 
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believes Bill could have got a higher price from another buyer; “but he was selling 
his family-soul and the price was not as important”, Acke says.   
 
Active and Nederman were never integrated, neither practically nor culturally - 
Nederman continued as before. Active invested and believed in Nederman, 
they liked the culture and spirit. However, culturally the firms were very 
different; “if Nederman’s culture smelled like gasoline from the work-shop, Active’s culture 
was shiny from marble in the bank office”, Lars-Erik visualises. Nevertheless, Bo 
always liked Nederman’s culture and spirit and even used it as example in other 
firms.  
 
“The employee reaction was positive; they knew Bo and thought he was funny and fresh”, 
Lennart explains. “We went there and told them in person and clarified that we were going 
to continue to invest in Nederman and that nothing was going to change.” That Bill had 
“planted” the decision and was satisfied was important for many employees. It 
seemed like they were happy for him. To avoid confusion, what and how things 
where going to be said was carefully prepared. “The thought was that everyone should 
be told the same thing and as we kind of knew Nederman we could more or less predict the 
reactions”, Acke tells. Nederman’s management, not employees, actually worried 
the most, but no one left the organisation and no one had to be fired.  
 
Everyone at Nederman were then invited to Active. Cultural differences then 
became obvious, which at first scared Nederman’s employees. But as they 
realised no major changes were going to take place, they became satisfied. All 
old traditions were kept, for example the monthly “mass-meeting” continued, 
when the whole firm was shut down and everything that went on was 
discussed. The only difference was that Bo participated every now and then, 
instead of Bill. Other important things, such as personnel trips, Christmas 
parties and gifts also continued; “and these are the things people really care about”, 
Lars-Erik says. The Nederman-spirit was kept, mostly owing to Bill and Bo 
having similar personalities; “it was just Bo who smoked cigars and discussed hockey and 
motorcycles with the lads in the workshop instead of Bill and Bill also continued to visit”, 
Acke says.   
 
Acke concludes; “Overall, the relationship was the determining factor for the acquisition. 
Without a personal relationship, respect, and a functional business relationship Active would 
not have bought Nederman. The personal chemistry was the platform. Active knew everything 
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about Nederman and was part of the evolution of the firm. Thus the risk was small and the 
trust large. There was an informal hands-on ”we’ll-fix-it” spirit. We could talk openly about 
problems, which was important. The acquisition evolved”.  
6.4.1 Analysis  
─ Nature of the pre-M&A relationship 
The relationship was initiated on professional basis and at that time there was 
no personal connection. Bill paid Bo. The relationship developed and deepened 
over time, much owed to the fact that Bill and Bo got on so well. They were of 
the same kind and the personal chemistry matched; entrepreneurial spirit, 
creativity, and dynamic approach were the common denominators. The 
relationship was special in that it involved tax consultancy, which is very critical 
and important for many companies. Bo was there to provide much needed 
help. It is likely that this specific relationship developed extra strong trust and 
dependency, especially from Bills side. Consequently, it deepened in the sense 
that over time Bo became a general advisor and source of ideas for Nederman, 
and even for Bill personally. After a while, he handled most economic issues 
for the company and structured Bill’s personal economy. It actually deepened 
to the extent that they were seeing each other as friends.  
 
The relationship between Active and Nederman further deepened in that it 
came to involve other persons at Nederman and Active. The relation was 
founded on respect and trust, especially between Bo and Bill. However, with 
time this spread to the rest of the company. We believe this was partly because 
Bo often visited Nederman in person and took time to hang around the site 
and chat with other employees. In this way, the employees realised he was just 
like Bill. Additionally, the fact that the relationship involved others, the CEO 
and the marketing manager, also meant they could have transferred their 
feelings to the rest of the firm.    
 
The relationship was extraordinary as it was long, deep, personal, and involved 
many at Nederman. It further developed an extra personal level. Possibilities 
for social capital to evolve were many and social capital benefits of trust and a 
cooperative and open atmosphere where information was easily accessed can 
clearly be identified.   
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─ Motive, need and idea 
The motive for the acquisition stemmed out of circumstances, Bill wanted to 
sell and Bo was there and thus saw an opportunity. The deep relationship had 
also meant Bo gained extensive insight into Nederman. As a consultant he had 
seen and dealt with all Nederman’s strengths and weaknesses. It did not involve 
only economic issues, he had learned about the culture, decision-making 
processes, management style, and other crucial issues. It can thus be said that 
his insight into the softer issues also contributed to his perception of the future 
potential of Nederman. Further, it points to the fact that corporate culture can 
be transferred and detected as a result of a relationship. As a matter of fact, Bo 
had even been involved in shaping Nederman’s development; he had created 
the company, as he wanted it, before he even bought it. In that sense he 
formed his own opportunity. The relationship thus set the scene and created 
the motive of a profitable investment. It is important to point out, however, 
that the motive first arose after the circumstances created it.  
 
─ Search and screening 
It is questionable if Active would have acquired Nederman if the previous 
relationship had not been present. The friendly atmosphere of the relationship 
meant that Bo had full insight and knew everything about Nederman. This 
included knowledge about the cultural fit between Nederman and Bo. This 
contributed to Bo’s perception of future potential of Nederman, as practical 
business issues are easier to change compared to corporate culture.   
 
Search and screening did not occur in this case. For Nederman it is possible 
that the acquisition would not have occurred without the relationship. Bill was 
selling his family business. Trust in the new owner was vital. Active was not 
searching for a firm to acquire, an opportunity just arose. Additionally, the ego-
aspect of being perceived as the saviour most likely also played a role for Bo. 
Psychological factors can thus also be influential.  
 
─ Evaluation, negotiations and the resulting agreement  
As explained, evaluation in this case occurred throughout the whole 
relationship. Thus, due diligence was not conducted in this case. The win-win 
situation also meant no traditional negotiations were carried out. The 
relationship and social capital created thus played a large role in this stage.    
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─ Integration, adaptation and current cooperation 
The employee reaction was positive, much owed to the pre-M&A relationship 
and the fact that Bo and Bill had similar personalities. They all knew Bo’s 
personality and social capital had developed. Additionally, the fact that Bill had 
planted the decision and was happy with Bo as the new owner seemed to have 
mattered for employees. If Bill had not been satisfied, the situation, with the 
founder disappearing, could have meant traumatic stress. When employees 
visited Active the cultural clash was obvious, but as employees knew Bo and his 
personality they still felt reassured. Hence, this did not lead to problems.  
 
After the acquisition, Nederman more or less continued to function as before. 
All routines, traditions, and cultural aspects of Nederman were kept. This might 
be due to the extensive knowledge gained during the previous relationship. 
Further, the fact that Bo had been part of Nederman’s development meant he 
had already started to influence the aspects he thought necessary. Hence, the 
acquisition was more of a formality.  
 
─ Termination   
When Active ran into financial problems, Nederman was sold. Instead of the 
long-term investment Bo had promised, Nederman thus became just another 
deal. The relationship only mattered as long as it was profitable. When in 
trouble, neither second thought nor weight was given to the previous 
relationship, commitment, and trust developed.  
 
Thus, one has to be careful not to ascribe the pre-M&A relationship too much 
importance. The acquisition would never have occurred purely “for-old-times-
sake” or a chance just to be kind. Had Bo not seen potential with Nederman, 
he would never have taken the decision to acquire it. However, his knowledge 
about Nederman and the insight into potential future opportunities were gained 
through the pre-M&A relationship. 
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7 OVERALL ANALYSIS 
This chapter aims to analyse and characterise the nature of the social capital developed in the 
pre-M&A relationships and how this later influenced the aims and common problems in the 
M&A process. Other important findings will also be highlighted. To conduct this analysis 
cases are compared and contrasted. 
7.1 Nature of social capital developed in the pre-M&A 
relationships 
The discussion below will outline differences in the social capital that 
developed in the pre-M&A relationships. The type of the pre-M&A 
relationship differed in several aspects, as illustrated in table 6 below. It will be 
discussed in the framework of Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) three 
dimensions. Thereafter, we will look at what role the social capital created had 
in the M&A process. Thereby, potential implications of the differences in the 
social capital created in each case will be dealt with. Additionally, the next 
section will also include significant findings not attributable to social capital or 
the pre-M&A relationship. 
  
Table 6: Pre-M&A relationship characteristics      
Case Aim Industry Length of pre-M&A relationship 
Abigo-DHC Distribution Biotech 7 years 
International corp-
Bioteknik AB  R&D experiment Biotech 1 year  
WS-Bioglan None Biotech None  
Active-NM Consultancy Engineering 5 years 
7.1.1 Structural social capital  
In the International corp.-Bioteknik AB case there were only few direct links 
between the companies, limited to top-management. Thus the network density 
(see page 45) was low. In the Active-Nederman case, the network configuration 
looked different. In Nederman many employees came in contact with Bo and 
got to know the kind of person he was.  The density was high. In Active 
however, the density was low, only Bo had a relationship to Nederman. Finally, 
in Abigo-DHC, the structural social capital was limited in the sense of personal 
connections. It also involved only top management. However, seen from 
another angle, the density at DHC can be argued to be high. The employees at 
DHC were involved in distributing Abigo’s products, which can be seen as 
another type of linkage between the companies. Indirect linkages are also 
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identified in International corp. -Bioteknik AB, where Denise  constituted this 
link. The structural differences are believed to have influenced the relational 
social capital created, which will be discussed below. 
 
The extensive structural social capital in Active-Nederman and Abigo-DHC, 
where strong networks ties were the main characteristic, enabled the crucial 
knowledge sourcing that occurred over time. In International corp.-Bioteknik 
AB knowledge of the technical fit was instead gained through the result of the 
research experiment, as research was the primary motive for the relationship.  
7.1.2 Relational social capital   
In this aspect the social capital that developed in the cases also differed. In 
Active-Nederman and Abigo-DHC, trust and trustworthiness were clear and 
characterised the relationships. Relational social capital (see page 47) was 
prominent. This was both a result of, and maybe also a reason for, common 
norms in the form of business approach and management cultures. In both 
cases the matching personal chemistry of the people involved formed the basis 
for this trust. However, specifically important in Abigo-DHC, was the 
successful sales of Abigo’s products and a problem-free interaction between the 
companies, such as goods delivery and invoicing. This meant that to a certain 
extent the trust DHC’s employees felt towards Abigo actually was based on 
non-personal interactions. However, we have seen no signs that the differing 
bases for relational social capital have influenced the role of the existing 
relational social capital. We believe the strong relational social capital that has 
been formed is partly a result of the strong structural social capital.  
 
The relational social capital in International corp.-Bioteknik AB differed in the 
sense that personal chemistry was not outstanding. The R&D experiment did 
not involve personal interaction and trust to the same extent as the 
relationships in the other cases did. It was also not dependent on such factors. 
Another contributing aspect is that within R&D, relationships and 
collaborations are very common. Thus it is likely that less weight and personal 
investment is given to each as compared to, for example, a distribution 
agreement. Further, the structural ties were fewer. All together, this is likely to 
have resulted in weaker relational social capital developing in this case.  
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One common denominator, which might influence the differences in the social 
capital developed, is time. The previous relations in Active-Nederman and 
Abigo-DHC were longer than in International corp.-Bioteknik AB. Could it 
thus be that, in general, time is crucial for the development of relational and 
strong social capital? Further, the type of interaction that the previous 
relationship aimed for could also be a decisive factor. For example, consultancy 
and distribution is likely to lead to more dependency than a small-scale research 
project. Dependency might lead to increased commitment, which in turn might 
lead to further investments into the relationship. Hence, this is likely to 
strengthen the social capital. Additionally, the motive and need for the M&A is 
likely to have also affected the relational social capital developed. In Nederman 
and DHC, there was an acute need, and thus a wish, to be acquired. In 
Bioteknik AB, employees had to realise they had failed and thus needed 
additional external resources. This is bound to be foundational to the attitude 
of the acquisition, even though Bioteknik AB was, under the circumstances, 
happy with International corp. 
 
Thus, structural social capital can enable and influence the development of 
relational social capital. Time and aim of the previous relationship and the 
motive of the acquisition are also likely to contribute to differences observed in 
both structural and relational social capital.  
7.1.3 Cognitive social capital  
The empirical study has not detected that any form of cognitive social capital 
(see page 49) was developed in the pre-M&A relationship in any of the cases. 
When a previous relationship has existed, cognitive social capital is likely to 
have developed as a natural consequence of interactions. Over time employees 
adapt expression and communication to each other unconsciously. Over time 
they further gain common stories and events to refer back to. However, as 
these issues are so natural and unconscious they are hard to detect or 
investigate in a research project such as this. Even though this was attempted, 
none of the subjects could relate to the issue.  
 
In International corp.-Bioteknik AB, the previous relationship was within 
R&D. As mentioned the research community already seems to have a language 
and common frame of reference of their own. Does this imply that cognitive 
social capital already exists on a “niche-wide” basis? However, in the rest of the 
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company, a lack of cognitive social capital might well later become a problem, 
when employees interpret messages, decisions, and communication differently. 
Especially since both sides are communicating in their second language, 
English. Both are then likely to express what they mean in an unclear manner.  
 
The discussed findings of the levels and nature of social capital are summarised 
in table 7 below.  
 
Table 7: Strength of the different dimensions of social capital (S.C)  
Case Structural S.C  Relational S.C Cognitive S.C 
Abigo-DHC HIGH HIGH X 
International corp-
Bioteknik AB  LOW LOW X 
WS-Bioglan ---------------------------------- ---------------------- ------------------------- 
Active-NM NM:HIGH   Active:LOW HIGH X 
7.2 Social capital in the M&A context 
7.2.1 The process view 
The cases and the case-analysis confirm that the process view (see page 22) is a 
realistic view of the M&A process. We have, for example, seen that motives 
have strongly influenced the negotiation process and how employees have 
reacted to the news of being acquired. Employee satisfaction in turn avoided 
common problems in the second phase of the M&A process. Less problems in 
the overall process also means less value destruction. Shorter evaluation and 
negotiation processes as well as shorter “slow-down” periods after the 
announcement of the mergers are such indications observed in our study. In 
line with Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) we believe that the smoothness and 
ease with which the M&A process is gone through contributes to long term 
value creation.  
 
Another thought behind the process view is that constant changing 
environment and unpredictable human responses make pre-M&A strategic 
analysis and financial evaluation far from reliable. It is therefore argued that 
synergies cannot be estimated before put in practice. However, the result of our 
studies show that through a pre-M&A relationship synergies can indeed be 
realised before the deal is signed. In this context, we have seen that both soft 
and hard synergies are important, and that especially the soft synergies are 
much easier to evaluate as a result of this.  
OVERALL ANALYSIS 
 95
In all cases, the pre-M&A relationship has exposed potential through 
organisational and human issues. For example corporate culture, management 
philosophy and decision-making processes have been possible to evaluate, 
factors very important for efficiently running a business. These issues are 
perceived as harder to change, compared to other practical issues, which 
further emphasises their importance. When evaluating future potential, 
examining financial reports and balance sheets reveal the company’s history. 
However, a pre-M&A relationship can additionally and maybe more 
importantly, give an insight into future potential. It is commonly recognised 
that a business is only as good as its employees and that human issues might 
destroy value. The literature review showed that management tends to rush 
through M&A processes and forget to consider softer synergies. However these 
issues prove important, as human-related problems are commonly occurring, 
which is why our finding might be even more important and interesting. Our 
findings indicate that considering soft synergies is important before the deal is 
signed and that a pre-M&A relationship provides an accurate evaluation of 
these issues, as they can only truly be evaluated when put in practice. Hence, a 
pre-M&A relationship makes evaluation of softer synergies more reliable and 
complete.  
 
Further, our research has shown that “soft” issues have been very influential in 
shaping the motive and the subsequent decision to acquire or sell. It should, 
however, not be forgotten that synergistic effects through technical fit or 
practical functionality are also very influential. This is most clearly seen in the 
case of International corp.-Bioteknik AB and Abigo-DHC. For example these 
relationships illustrated research and product complemantarity, potential for 
further development, and the efficiency of cooperation. Consequently, putting 
both soft and hard synergies in practice is actually what the pre-M&A 
relationship is doing. Finally, this argumentation is also strengthened by the 
Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan case, where no pre-M&A relationship existed. The 
case-analysis concluded that lack of insight into the potential hard and soft 
synergies, were the reason why the integration later failed. The pre-M&A 
relationship can thus be seen as an analysis of the softer issues and technical fit.    
7.2.2 Before the deal is signed 
In the academic literature, the need and idea of an acquisition comes before 
search and screening, where organisational and strategic fit is often analysed. 
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However, in the cases of Abigo-DHC and Active-Nederman, it was the selling 
firm that had a need. This need was not present when the relationship was 
initiated. When the need arose for the selling firm, the acquiring part had 
realised the organisational and strategic fit as a result of the pre-M&A 
relationship. In this way, the pre-M&A relationship visualised a window-of-
opportunity for the acquiring firm. Thus, at that moment the motive was 
formed due to knowledge gained. Even though a pre-M&A did not exist, this is 
similar to the case of Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan, where the selling firm also 
triggered the opportunity for the acquiring firm, which did not have a need. 
 
Finally, in the case of International corp.-Bioteknik AB , need and motive were 
present at both firms before the pre-M&A relationship was initiated. However, 
similarly to the other cases, the pre-M&A relationship visualised the technical 
and organisational fit, such as corporate culture, management style and 
employee capability as well.  
 
Our cases further highlight that a previous relationship can potentially avoid 
common problems occurring before the deal is signed. To start with, a 
fragmented insight in the process (see page 24), which can create problems, has 
in all cases with previous relationship been avoided. We believe this is due to 
the knowledge gained in advance as a result of the social capital. Our cases have 
shown that the stronger social capital, the less need of outside consultants and a 
large number of individuals involved in the M&A process. This is seen in for 
example Active-Nederman, as compared to Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan. Where no 
social capital existed consultants handled this. However, it is crucial to point 
out that this might also be because these cases were rather small. Thus, from 
this study it is not possible to conclude which role the pre-M&A relationship 
had in this particular matter. 
 
The negotiations were further characterised by openness, in those cases where a 
pre-M&A relationship existed. The cases indicate that a pre-M&A relationship 
lead to an understanding of each other’s expectations and intentions. Hence, 
this leads to openness during negotiations, which facilitates discussions around 
potentially conflicting views. Consequently, knowledge and open 
communication are likely to diminish the likelihood of a deteriorating effect on 
trust in a later stage, as misinterpretations are less likely to have occurred. The 
negotiations were also shortened as a result of this openness. These benefits of 
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social capital can be seen in all cases where a pre-M&A relationship existed. In 
the Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan case, the lack of a pre-M&A relationship highlights 
the lack of insight into synergistic potential, discussed above. Lack of open 
communication, where such issues could have been discussed and realised, 
negatively influenced the subsequent M&A process. Openness, honesty and 
belief in the other part could hence have counter-balanced negative effects. 
However, openness is precisely one of the benefits of social capital. The 
atmosphere for open communication is hard to achieve without a pre-M&A 
relationship.  
7.2.3 The post-agreement stage: facilitating the process 
The academic literature has emphasised the importance of integration in 
making M&A work. This can easily be misinterpreted to mean that full 
integration is always desirable. However, our cases have shown that this must 
not necessarily be the case. Integration, is in fact everything from interacting as 
two separate units, to merging into a single new unit (see page 33). It can be 
hypothesised that in some instances, full integration is a way of controlling an 
uncertain situation. Where relational social capital exists, which can be 
developed through a pre-M&A relationship, this may not be necessary. The 
trust present counter-balanced the need for control. Maybe this is instead why a 
high degree of autonomy is given to DHC, in the Abigo-DHC case. DHC 
operates as a sister-firm to Abigo, rather than as a subsidiary. This might also 
contribute to why International corp.-Bioteknik AB, where geographical and 
cultural differences are larger, aim for full integration. However, the motive of 
technical complementarity is also why full integration is preferred in this 
particular case, at least in the R&D department. This leads us to reflect over the 
actual need of integration, specifically when the M&A follows as a natural step 
of the previous relationship. In the case of Abigo-DHC and Active-Nederman, 
we have seen that the two firms more or less continued working as they did 
before the M&A. The M&A can thus be argued to simply be a formal decision, 
without large practical implications. This finding is in line with Andersson et al’s 
(1998) conclusions.   
 
Regardless of the level or need of integration, it is clear that an atmosphere that 
supports transfer of strategic capabilities and cooperation is vital in every M&A 
situation. To achieve this, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) argue for an essential 
role of a cause-effect understanding of the benefits of M&A. We believe that a 
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pre-M&A relationship can provide this. Insight in future potential and 
enhanced competitive advantage made possible by the social capital created 
discussed earlier is such understanding according to us. Interestingly, in 
International corp.-Bioteknik AB , where the network density was low, the 
employees nevertheless indirectly gained this understanding. This was mainly 
due to Denise’s unconscious role as opinion leader at Bioteknik AB. As such, 
employees looked up and listened to her. Judging from her reactions and 
attitude, employees then formed their understanding which made them positive 
towards the deal. This is an interesting finding since it could have implications 
for the M&A process. If it is possible to identify opinion leaders in both firms 
and make them realise the potential value and gains of the M&A, they in turn 
could affect the attitude of the large parts of the firm. In such cases, cause-
effect understanding does not need to be corporation-wide to have an impact. 
However, opinion leaders can also pose a risk. If they are negative to the M&A, 
they can equally affect a large part of the employees. The negative atmosphere 
can in such case be hard to eradicate.  
 
Reciprocal organisational understanding is also argued to be important for the 
achievement of a positive and functional atmosphere (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991, see page 29). Again, in cases with a pre-M&A relationship, we see that 
social capital created during the pre-M&A relationship has given this before the 
deal was initiated. In the International corp.-Bioteknik AB case this was gained 
in a neutral environment. This meant that the judgement of the other part was 
less guarded and more open-minded, which we believe to be important in this 
case. However, in Active-Nederman and Abigo-DHC, reciprocal organisational 
understanding was also achieved, but in the firm environment. The natural 
setting in those cases was instead the fact that there were no motives to merge 
present during the pre-M&A relationship. In this aspect, relational social 
capital, where dyadic and generalised trust as well as norms seems to be 
important, enabled reciprocal organisational understanding. Reciprocal 
organisational understanding of course also contributes to, or is a prerequisite 
to, the organisational-human potential discussed earlier.  
 
A willingness to work together is found in all cases and contributes to the 
atmosphere of capability transfer. However, we do not ascribe the previous 
relationship nor the social capital created in it much role here. Contrary, our 
cases indicate a role of both firm’s motives in creating this willingness. This is 
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strengthened by the fact that the willingness also existed in the Wilh.Sonesson-
Bioglan case without pre-M&A cooperation.  
 
We have seen that the relationships in their totality have critically influenced the 
motives in these cases. Social capital was, in this respect, important as it enabled 
the evaluation of the potential organisational and human issues, otherwise often 
forgotten but seen as vital when actually faced by them. In turn both the 
motives and social capital affected the atmosphere during and after the M&A.  
7.2.4 The post-agreement stage: avoiding problems 
In our cases, we have seen indications that the motive and need in the 
acquisitions played a primary role in diminishing the occurrence of value 
destruction. The motives and needs in both firms have clearly shaped the basic 
attitude of employees and also influenced management. This is because the 
motive has indicated what to expect in later stages and revealed that no 
threatening actions are likely to be undertaken. Employees have mainly based 
their expectations on indirect contact with the other firm. However, for 
management, their expectations have been influenced by what they have 
actually experienced in the previous relationship. The social capital and resilient 
trust created as a result of successful pre-M&A cooperation have made them 
confident that their expectations are to be fulfilled. However, looking at it from 
another point of view, putting too much faith in the other party as a result of 
the social capital could prove dangerous. Reality and conditions might change, 
thus making changes necessary. Erosion of trust can then be the result. 
However, this is not something we have observed in our research.  
 
Leadership vacuum (see page 32) is another commonly occurring problem in 
the M&A process. In our cases this has not been a problem. However, this is 
rather a result of personal business approach and management philosophy, 
than an effect of the pre-M&A relationship. The leadership approaches in these 
cases seem to have positively influenced the M&A processes.   
 
In no cases, has management seen a need for, or attempted, cultural integration, 
neither with regards to corporate nor national culture. The only possible 
exception would be that Abigo has tried to transfer the long-term business 
approach to DHC. The cultural approach used by all firms is thus what 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1988) would term “integration” (see page 33). In 
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our cases, this seems so far to be a good decision. It looks like the previous 
relationship has enabled an analysis and assessment of each other’s cultures. 
Further, it seems like the cultures were perceived as rather similar from the 
beginning. In some instances cultures were even adapted to each other before 
the acquisition occurred. Taken together, this took the edge off the issue of 
cultural differences. Instead, the signs can be interpreted as cultural differences 
being appreciated and being seen as necessary for running an international 
company. However, it is important to point out that other studies have shown 
that cultural negligence is very dangerous in M&A’s. It has for example been 
illustrated that if cultures are perceived as similar, negligence can lead to major 
problems (Jönsson 2003). International M&As in some instances therefore also 
have a larger chance of succeeding with cultural integration (Larsson and 
Lubatkin). Thus, a previous relationship and a feeling of already knowing each 
other’s cultures could thus prove risky.  
 
A common reason for acculturation problems is that the acquired firm is 
seldom given enough autonomy. However, in all cases, the acquired companies 
were actually given high autonomy. This could be another reason contributing 
to the lack of cultural clashes. In the International corp. -Bioteknik AB case, we 
have not yet seen the end of the M&A process and the attempts of integration. 
Therefore, clashes may occur later, when integration becomes more obvious. 
As discussed earlier, the fact that Denise, who is responsible for much of the 
positive attitude and has transferred this, is leaving might actually lead to 
problems. Can the positive atmosphere and cooperative spirit be sustained 
without her? If not, hostility is likely to result in cultural clashes.  
 
Social control has been argued in the literature by, for example, Larsson and 
Lubatkin (2001), to have the capacity to effectively counterbalance problems in 
the cultural integration and the M&A process in general. In Abigo-DHC and 
Active-Nederman, social control in the form of informal communication and 
joint socialisation has indeed proven efficient. In these cases, the fact that they 
knew each other made these aspects self-evident and maybe not initiated 
because there was an indirect motive of social control. Nonetheless, that is 
what they did. In the International corp.-Bioteknik AB case however, the pre-
M&A relation was not as personal and the relational social capital not as 
prominent. Neither was the social capital created as wide and deep. However, 
social control was viewed as important which is why, for example, task-forces 
OVERALL ANALYSIS 
 101
and social events were arranged. Where there is a personal pre-M&A 
relationship and strong relational social capital our findings points to social 
control occurring unconsciously and naturally, whereas otherwise it is a 
conscious aim. The fact that social control is not a conscious aim if relational 
social capital exists might however turn out to be risky. If neglected 
management loses an effective control mechanism much-needed in the M&A 
process.  
 
Social control in the form of communication proved effective in the Active-
Nederman case. The messages transmitted to employees were carefully 
prepared to be consistent and the former owner had “planted” the decision. 
The previous relationship played a role here, as management thought they 
knew how employees would react and formed the communication thereafter. 
Yet again however, it could have gone wrong. Human behaviour and reactions 
are difficult to predict even if a previous relationship exists. Employees could 
have felt, for example, too controlled and steered, resulting in hostility. They 
may also feel forced to act after a certain standard and therefore experience 
stress, leading to value destruction. It might also negatively affect innovative 
capacity which would be especially important for the Bt industry. 
7.2.5 Final comparison  
Conclusively, the main difference identified between the cases with and without 
pre-M&A relationship, is that without a pre-M&A relationship evaluation and 
knowledge about potential soft and hard synergies are harder to achieve. This 
later posed a problem for Wilh.Sonesson-Bioglan, as explained. Further, 
without social capital open communication was hard to achieve.  
  
Going back to our initial understanding of the benefits and risk of social capital 
in the M&A process, the above findings are summarised in the model 
previously used (compare to figure 4), illustrated below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OVERALL ANALYSIS 
 102
Figure 6: Benefits in the M&A process derived from the pre-M&A relationship  
 
 
  
Note: Risks illustrated in boxes with broken lines, benefits are underlined. The figure does not explain 
interrelationships between risks and benefits.  
 
Source: Lindau-Jonsson and Persson (2003) 
 
Interestingly, the role of a pre-M&A relationship in the M&A process does not 
seem to differ between industries. Reasons for differences were instead factors 
such as aim of the pre-M&A relationship, time, personality, motive, and 
circumstances. This clearly strengthens the analytical generalisation of our 
research.  
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8 DISCUSSION 
It is now time to reflect over the actual outcome of our research and discuss it in relation to our 
initial understanding, i.e. why some things did not turn out as expected. Further, theoretical 
and practical contributions will be discussed and presented.  
 
The results point to a role of pre-M&A relationships and social capital in the 
M&A process. However, we initially thought effects would be most noticeable 
in the integration phase after an agreement had been reached. As it turned out, 
the effects of pre-M&A relationship and social capital played a much larger role 
in the first phase. The reasons seem to be several. First, the literature has 
ascribed the integration a key role in making M&A work. This coloured the 
initial perception. Secondly, the motive behind the M&A is vital for the whole 
M&A process. We previously did not ascribe this large influence. However, as 
it turned out, the pre-M&A relationships and the circumstances formed the 
motive. This in turn also affected the need and view of integration. Important 
to point out is that the benefits and roles social capital had in the early phase 
affected strategy and approaches after the deal was signed. An earlier and 
functional cooperation might reduce the need of, and motivation for, 
integration. If there is already an effective work routine why change it? This 
becomes especially clear in the Abigo-DHC case. Thus the pre-M&A 
relationship has been influential in both phases, however the first phase stands 
out in that we had not attributed it much importance before conducting the 
study.    
 
As mentioned, the motive had a large influence in the whole M&A process. 
The most remarkable aspect is how it actually affected employee’s attitudes, 
expectations and satisfaction after the deal was signed. This implies that when 
planning and implementing integration strategies, attention must be paid to the 
possible repercussions of the motive. The consequence of the motive must be 
thoroughly explained. If the motive is positive this should be fully utilised to 
create a positive attitude and calm atmosphere in the firms, which is important 
for an effective M&A process. A deeper investigation of the motives and their 
influence on the M&A process and its outcome, would thus be an interesting 
future direction. 
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In our research, the motives’ prominent influence could be due to the fact that 
cases were special. In some cases, the circumstances were such that the 
announcement could not have been received in any other way. The alternative 
was death for the company or at least great uncertainty. There was thus a need 
of being acquired. This points to the importance of not only considering the 
M&A process from the acquirer’s point of view. The balance of power is not 
always evident and it might just as well be the acquired firm’s motive that 
proves to be most influential. 
 
Circumstances surrounding cases was also a factor not initially thought of, that 
turned out very influential. As a matter of fact, circumstances have in some 
cases created a need for the selling firm. The pre-M&A relationship in turn 
visualised the opportunities created by the circumstances, leading to motive for 
the acquiring firm. These facts further emphasise how being part of a network 
and investing in business relationships could benefit the firm. It also reveals 
how unpredictable business can be and that in reality, business is not always 
guided by rationality. Obviously, the previous relationship did not create these 
circumstances. However had the relationship not been there, these 
circumstances would not have been detected by the involved firms. One 
potential exception from this is the Active-Nederman case, where it is possible 
that the owner of Nederman would not have sold the firm if a relationship did 
not exist. Within the relationship the owner found a successor he trusted and 
felt comfortable with. In this case, it can hence be argued that the relationship 
to a certain extent formed the opportunity.   
 
Our initial thoughts regarding the effects of social capital in the M&A process, 
pointed out potential risks. Even though probable risks were identified as a 
result of the empirical findings, none of these were actually detected in reality. 
Without further investigation, this is hard to explain. However, some potential 
explanations are suggested. To start, due to the limited integration in most 
cases, conditions for cooperation did not change. Secondly, the transferability 
of social capital found could mean that no hostility arose as an effect of the 
limited scope of the relationships. Finally, the realistic view of the relationship 
limited over-investment, lockage and that overly high expectations were 
formed.   
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One can question if relations are more or less important in small- versus large-
scale M&As. It could be argued that relationships are given more attention and 
weight in smaller M&As, as firms do not need to externally justify their 
decisions to the same extent. Additionally, an informal atmosphere might be 
more easily be achieved. However, it could be equally argued that the 
importance of relationship and social capital is even bigger in larger, more 
complex, and uncertain M&As. It is likely that the need for social capital and 
social control in such cases is even larger. Further, it might also be the case that 
business is ultimately personal and that formal processes of, for example, due 
diligence could be viewed as being external justification of internal decisions to 
a certain extent.  
8.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
As a result of the empirical study we have also reflected upon the theoretical 
concepts presented in this thesis. The literature review together with the case 
studies and analysis has led us to question the way in which sources of social 
capital are presented. The framework used speaks about four sources of social 
capital (se page 43). However, what also feels like an important source is the 
commitment, economic and emotional, to the relationship. Commitment is an 
aspect emphasised in the Uppsala process thinking, which indeed seems to be 
important. It could be argued that belief and motivation together is 
commitment, but we feel commitment is crucial enough to emphasis. We 
would therefore like to complement sources of social capital with commitment. 
Additionally, the study has indicated that trust must not only be the result of a 
social interaction. In the Abigo-DHC case we observed that trust for Abigo 
was formed, not only from the problem-free relation, but in fact also on their 
knowledge and appreciation of Abigo’s products. It could thus be proposed 
that sources of social capital need not involve social interactions or human 
contact. Trust is still trust, it is not dependent on its source.   
 
The transferability of relational social capital, in the form of a positive attitude 
and confidence is also an interesting finding. Confidence has been transferred 
via indirect links when network density was low. As discussed, this is a 
phenomena occurring via key persons or so-called opinion leaders. However, 
findings also indicated that deeper feelings, such as trust, did not have the same 
propensity to diffuse via top management. Indirect transfer is an aspect that 
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Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) have not considered in their framework. Hence 
also an interesting angle for future research to consider.  
 
Our findings indicate that knowledge gained during a pre-M&A relationship is 
important for a smooth and effective M&A process. Hence, it could potentially 
be argued that absence of such knowledge might affect the processes 
negatively. This would then be similar to what is argued to be the problem 
facing firms that go international. Thus, in M&As such knowledge could be 
gained by committing to a relationship. This will enable companies to better 
evaluate future risks and opportunities in the form of both soft and hard 
synergies. As seen, this can actually trigger a motive for an acquisition later. 
Hence the initial commitment to the relationship and the knowledge gained can 
lead to a later M&A. Thus these findings conform to the Uppsala process 
thinking (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Maybe our findings indicate the Uppsala 
model can be applied to other forms of firm-development, not only 
internationalisation, as the same obstacles and issues appear to be important for 
progress, as indicated also by Andersson et al (1997).  
 
Another finding with similar theoretical implications is that International corp. 
and Bioteknik AB were embedded in the same network before they initiated 
the research experiment. This enabled people from both companies to access 
information and form an opinion of each other. The Uppsala process model 
(Andersson et al 1997) predicts that such shared embeddedness is likely to assist 
in a merger situation, especially the integration process. Following our findings, 
we would also like to emphasise the importance of considering potential 
benefits of shared embeddedness already in the first phase. The integration 
process is not finished in this case, thus it would have been interesting to 
follow its development. For example, the integration of sales forces might run 
smoother as a result of their shared customer base. An area of continuation 
would be to look more closely at the role of pre-M&A shared embeddedness in 
the M&A process. 
 
Finally, in our opinion much focus, especially in media, has been put on mega-
mergers and their problems. We have a feeling also that the literature has been 
steered by this and common problems experienced in these specific situations. 
Small scale M&As seem to be forgotten. Our findings indicate issues are not 
always of the same character in such cases. First, media gives the picture that 
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M&As often aim to reduce cost and increase share-holder value. However, our 
relatively small cases have not dealt at all with such aspects. None of the 
involved firms or individuals have even mentioned or hinted that these issues 
were the main considerations. Instead, true development through growth, 
synergies, and survival seem to be the drivers. Secondly, it might be the case of 
merger-mania among managers of large multinational corporations. It is 
fashionable to merge. In small cases, it might instead be a reality-based need 
and perceived potential for future value creation that lies behind M&A activity, 
as explained above. Thirdly, the personal level of business has been crucial in all 
cases in this study. All involved have looked for some type of personal match, 
whether it has been on a friendly level or on the practical level. In large mergers 
and firms this might not be at all possible. Then, in larger M&As human issues 
are more easily forgotten. Further, management in mega firms are likely to be 
more detached from both the rest of the firm and the reality that an M&A will 
actually mean for employees. This is not the case in smaller privately owned 
firms.  
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter will identify and highlight the main conclusions of this study. In doing so, we will 
answer the main research problem: 
 
 
 
 
The evaluation of future potential before entering an M&A agreement often 
includes financial, practical, and technical synergies. Further, these evaluations 
can only be based on current and historic information and events, hence 
making future potential hard to foresee. However, people components are 
considered to be of crucial strategic importance for firms and also a potential 
source of value destruction within the M&A process. As such they also predict 
a firm’s future potential. Interestingly, the most significant role of pre-M&A 
relationship in the M&A process is its ability to reveal and identify soft synergies 
before the M&A process is initiated. Findings show that the social capital 
created reveals synergies in the form of corporate culture, decision-making 
processes, management philosophies, and work-routines. They could further be 
accurately evaluated in real-life situations as they were put in practice during the 
relationship. This can hence increase the value of the deal and avoid common 
pitfalls in the M&A process.  
 
It was found that matching personal chemistry and connection could be 
evaluated instantaneously. However to reveal true soft synergies, a pre-M&A 
relationship was necessary. 
 
The knowledge gained through the social capital created, but also from the 
relationship in its totality, led to an understanding of each other’s expectations 
and intentions, as well as the valuable insight into synergies. This contributed to 
an atmosphere of open communication during the whole M&A process, which in turn 
diminished the likelihood of a deteriorating effect on trust in a later stage. Further, open 
communication was especially beneficial in evaluation and negotiation. This has 
substantially shortened the M&A process. However, the insight has also shortened 
the processes necessary to establish functional cooperative routines after the deal is 
signed. Usually, there is a slow-down period after the M&A because such 
What is the role of pre-M&A relationship in  
the M&A process? 
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routines do not function. However, if a relationship precedes the deal these are 
already in practice.  
 
Moving on from previous academic work, which has indicated that acquisition 
behaviour could be organic in nature (Andersson et al 1997) when previous 
relationship exist, we concluded that this indeed is true. Where a pre-M&A 
relationship existed, the merger became like a formal decision, which did not 
change the cooperation extensively. However, we argue that this is not only due 
to the common embeddedness. The pre-M&A relationship and the social capital 
created (knowledge, organisational and cultural understanding, and appreciation) 
has lessened the need for and thus affected motive and strategies applied in the 
cultural and practical integration. Where social capital is present integration thus 
becomes a smaller issue. This also very well coincides with and strengthens our 
initial thoughts (section 5.1.7); that cultural evaluation in a neutral setting such 
as a pre-M&A relationship, is likely to reduce the cultural stress and lead 
employees to not be afraid of the other part’s culture. This in turn was argued 
to result in the cultural integration process starting at acculturation. The strategy 
chosen for cultural integration in our cases was what Nahavandi and 
Malekzadeh (1988) term “integration”, thus further explaining why integration 
did not become a major issue for this thesis.   
 
This study indicates that some forms of social capital are indirectly transferable via 
opinion leader and even to some extent via non-social connections. This is thus 
challenging Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) view that network-configuration 
determines the extent of movement of information and knowledge between 
firms. This is also contradicting our own initial belief that a top-management 
relationship could create hostility in the firms (section 5.1.7).   
 
Knowledge gained as a result of the pre-M&A relationship and the social 
capital created reduces the risk perceived. The study thus gives support to the 
Uppsala process model (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).  
 
There has been an academic discussion on whether the best approach to 
integration is to find a “culturally compatible partner” or to manage cultural 
differences. The results of this study, contradictory to our first belief, indicate 
the best approach is to find a culturally compatible partner. Our findings are thus in line 
with Cartwright and Cooper (1993).  
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Relational social capital creates atmosphere of open communication. In the 
M&A process this led to a higher degree of autonomy for the acquired unit. This, in 
turn is likely to diminish the occurrence of value destruction. 
 
The pre-M&A social relations visualised opportunities for both the selling and the 
acquiring firm.  
 
The study also led to conclusions outside the main question, as it turned out 
that other factors were significantly affecting the M&A process. In our cases, 
most prominent was the influence of the motive. Hostile and negative employee 
reactions and attitudes were effectively avoided as a result of the motive. 
Instead, a willingness to work together was formed. To clarify, this was due to the 
fact that the motives of the firms meant no threat or negative consequences for 
the employees. Rather, it resulted in feelings such as relief and increased 
security. In turn, this contributes to a favourable atmosphere for capability transfer, 
diminishing the occurrence of value destruction. Where the previous relationship 
develops into dependency, this dependency is a decisive motivating factor for continuing 
the relationship and cooperation. The dependency also contributes to the motive.    
 
Circumstances played a decisive role in all cases. This illustrates how irrational 
and random business can be. However, it also illustrates how important networks 
and personal contacts really are. Without these some opportunities pass by 
without notice.  
9.1.1 Final propositions 
Finally, we wish to highlight the most interesting areas for future research by 
following propositions:  
 
A pre-M&A relationship… 
 
“visualises opportunities for M&As” 
 
“reveals, identifies and puts soft synergies in practice before the M&A process is initiated” 
 
“contributes to an atmosphere of open communication, which diminishes the likelihood of a 
deteriorating effect on trust in a later stage as well as shortens the first phase” 
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“shortens the processes necessary to establish functional cooperative routines after the deal is 
signed, as they are already in practice” 
 
“leads to a higher degree of autonomy preferred for acquired units” 
 
“means the cultural integration process can start at acculturation” 
 
“reduces perceived risk” 
 
The M&A motive can be utilised to… 
 
“increase the willingness of people to work together, thereby contributing to a favourable 
atmosphere of capability transfer, diminishing the occurrence of value destruction” 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
These questions have been used as a guideline and base to steer interviews and discussions.   
 
Presentation/Bakgrund: 
? Namn, position, tidigare anställning, tid på företaget, ansvar, 
delaktighet i fusion/förvärv, etc 
 
Relationen innan: 
Hade företgen någon relation till/samarbete innan förvärvet? Kan du i så fall 
beskriva relationen, från det att relationen uppstod tills det att tanken att 
förvärva uppkom? 
? Motiv 
? Typ (formell, informell, personlig) 
? Tidsaspekt (sedan hur långt tillbaka) 
? Mellan vilka på företagen (ledning eller andra avdelningar) 
? Hur ofta och på vilket sätt (business vs. Fritid, 
kommunikation, socialisering, utbyte av kunskap, användas 
för olika saker) 
 
Hur har relationen utvecklats med tiden? 
? Fördjupats (Utbyte oftare, träffats oftare) 
? Ökat i omfattning (Fler och fler från företagen involverade 
Fler avd.) 
? Ökat i förtroende? (även typ av förtroende) 
 
Vad tror Du relationen har medfört, förutom det som avsågs 
? Lärande (samarbete, kommunikation, att utbyta erfarenheter 
och kunskap) 
? Förståelse för varandra (kultur, normer, myter, arbetssätt, 
system, management) 
? Språkförståelse ändrats med tiden (svårigheter att förstå 
varandra) 
? Anpassar sig praktiskt till varandra (resurser, tidsscheman, 
processer) 
? Förtroende 
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Uppkom det några problem i relationen under denna tid och i så fall hur löstes 
dessa? 
? Varför uppkom de 
? Lärdomar? 
 
Motiv: 
Vilket var motivet bakom förvärvet 
? Företagskultur 
 
Kom idén om ett förvärv som ett resultat av er kännedom av företaget eller fick 
ni kännedom om företaget efter ett beslut att utvidga verksamheten? 
 
Påverkades motivet av er kännedom om företaget?  
 
Sökte det förvärvade företaget efter en förvärvspartner? 
 Varför? 
 
Sökande & Screening: 
Vilka tror Du är fördelarna/nackdelarna med att bli förvärvade av ett företag 
man redan känner till/har en relation med? Alt. Ett företag som man inte 
tidigare har haft någon kontakt med? 
 
Alt. om inget förhållande fanns innan, hur kom ni fram till valet av detta 
företag?  
? Kriterier 
? Rekommendation från andra 
? Tid och resurser spenderade på sökandet 
? Första bästa vs. Lång och noggrann process 
 
Letade ni efter alternativa företag även fast ni kände till den förvärvade 
partnern? 
? Varför, varför inte 
? Är det inte möjligt att det fanns ett ännu bättre alternativ 
 
Vilka är fördelarna/nackdelarna du ser med att förvärva ett företag man redan 
känner till/har en relation med? 
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Utvärdering: 
Tror du att den tidigare relationen på något sätt påverkat utvärderingen? 
? Finansiell värdering av relationen 
? Risk 
? Värdeskapande 
 
Såg ni några risker med att förvärva ett företag ni redan har en relation till? 
? På vilket sätt, varför, varför inte 
 
Förändrades förutsättningarna för relationen av uppköp och i så fall hur?  
? Vägdes detta in i riskbedömningen 
? Negativt el positivt 
 
Framkom negativ information om det företag som skulle förvärvas och hur 
påverkade detta i så fall inställningen om att förvärva företaget?  
? Varför, varför inte 
 
Förhandling: 
Hur såg förhandlings-processen ut i korthet? 
? Avspeglade besluten hur det förvärvade företgaet bedriver 
sin verksamhet eller togs hänsyn till hur det andra företaget 
bedriver sin verksamhet 
? Maktbalansen 
? Påverkade relationen förhandlingen (positivt genom 
”utnyttjning” av kännedomen eller ”begränsade” relationen 
förhandlings området) 
? Påverkades relationen av förhandligen 
 
Uppkom det några betydande problem/meningsskiljaktligheter under 
förhandlingen och i så fall hur hanterades dessa?  
 
Var det bara personer som varit involverade i den tidigare relationen som hade 
hand om förvärvs-processen till och med förhandlingarna? 
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Integrationen: 
Hur har kommunikationen till de anställda på företagen sett ut ang. förvärvet?  
? Har ledningen varit öppen med eller sluten under processen 
innan och under förhandlingarna, visste alla på Bioteknik 
AB  att något var på gång 
? Löften 
? ...som logisk följd av relationen 
 
Vilken syn har ledningen haft på behov och genomförnde av integration av 
företage? Finns det någon strategi?  
 
Kan du praktiskt beskriva hur integrationen har sett ut? 
? Vilka delar av företagen har integrerats (vilka 
avdelningar/personer har kontakt/samarbetar)  
? Vilken är synen på behovet av integration (även ”mjukare” 
aspekter, samarbetsvilja, överföring av kunskap) 
? Vilka är målen med integrationen (typ av kunskap som 
överförs?) 
? Resurser avsatt (tid, pengar, management, anställda, 
projektgrupp) 
? Symboliska handlingar Byta namn, administrations system, 
löner och förmånssystem samma Ledningsbyte 
? Rationaliseringar 
? Varför 
 
Tror du att den tidigare relationen påverkat integrationen? (Delar som redan 
var gjorda?) 
 
Finns det även strategier för att kulturellt integrera de två företagen?  
? Hur stor vikt har lagts på kulturell integration   
? Fanns olika företags kulturer, hur har det i så fall påverkat er 
verksamhet och integrationen 
? Har olika nationella kulturer påverkat integration  
? Kulturella problem? Företags/Nationella  
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? Har den tidigare relationen givit företagen en kulturell 
förståelse av varandra 
? Tror Du denna kulturella förståelse vägdes in i beslutet att 
förvärva företaget 
 
Kan du ge något konkret exempel på kulturella motsättningar som uppstått? 
 
Hur mottogs beslutet om förvärvet av de anställda på de båda företagen? 
? Reaktioner 
? Stress och osäkerhet 
 
Om negativa reaktioner uppstöd hur behandlades detta, vilka åtgärder togs och 
vilka var målen med dessa?  
? Hur försökte ledningen få de anställda positivt inställda till 
och förstå fördelarna med förvärvet (på båda företagen) 
? Socialisering (hur ofta, var, varför, varför inte) 
? Kommunikation (hur ofta, vilket sätt, varför, varför inte, 
vilket språk?) 
? Mänskliga aspekten (stress, osäkerhet, fientligt inställd) 
? Identifiera sig, ett företag, ej två (om detta är avsikten) 
 
Vad har gått smidigast under integrations processen? 
  
Vilka har det största problemen under integrationen som helhet varit? 
? Varför 
? Hur löste ni dem 
 
Uppstod oförutsedda situationer som förändrade processen, strategin eller 
synen på denna? 
 
Idag: 
Har förvärvet levt upp till era förväntningar, har fördelarna blivit vad ni trodde? 
Hur lång tid tog det innan ni kunde se denna förändring? 
? Avslutad (lyckad?) Definition av lyckad integration 
(aktiepris, patent, trivsel) 
? Hur ser samarbetet ut idag 
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? Utbyter de olika delarna kunskap med varandra, lär de sig av 
varandras erfarenheter 
? Innovativ kapacitet 
? Hur mycket anpassar sig de anställda på de båda företagen 
till varandra 
? Fortfarande psykologiska och organisatoriska aspekter 
(stress etc.) 
? Vilka aspekter jobbar ni vidare med 
 
Finns det idag en företags-kultur, eller kan man fortfarande märka två olika 
kultur? I så fall hur tar de sig uttryck? 
? Vi och dom eller bara Vi 
 
Har du lättare att förstå och relatera till andra anställda på det andra företaget 
idag om du jämför med början av relation? 
? Utvecklat gemensamma normer, uttryckssätt, etc 
? Gemensamt språk... 
 
I vilken utsträckning har  Ni samarbete/relationer till andra 
företag/forskare/universitet? 
 
Tror du att förtaget har lärt sig något av detta samarbete/dessa relationer som 
påverkar synen av förvärvs processen och den senare integrationsprocessen? 
? Underlättat/Försvårat 
? Öppenhet 
? Flexibilitet 
 
Har detta samarbete/dessa relationer påverkats av förvärvet? 
 
Hur stor påverkan i allmänhet tror du den tidigare relationen haft på hela 
processen? 
? Har vissa delar gått att hoppa över Eller var vissa aspekter 
redan etablerade och processer genomförda 
? Byggde förvärvet vidare på rutiner etablerade innan beslutet 
togs eller skappades nya sätt att jobba Förstördes gamla 
fungerande relationer 
? (I retro spekt hade det varit bättre att inte gå ihop)  
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Hur tror du innovativ kapacitet påverkas av en sammanslagning/förvärv?  
Relatera till Ert fall? 
 
Dokumentation? 
Finns någon dokumentation av någon sort från: 
Relationen/sammarbetet innan förvärvet? 
Processerna under förhandling, utvärdering, beslut tagna? 
Integrationen? (Kommunicationen om beslutet och integrationen till anställda) 
Rapportering av process förloppet? 
Undersökningar? 
Egna anteckningar? 
 
Svenska bioteknik industrin 
Hur skulle du karakterisera den svenska bioteknik industrin? Tydliga trender? 
 
Är samarbete, och iså fall vilken typ, vanligt förekommande mellan bioteknik 
företag i Sverige? 
 
Hur fungerar kluster verksamheten i verkligheten (i motsats till teorin och 
syftet)? 
 
Hur vanligt är det att detta även sker över lands gränserna? 
 
Tror du motiven bakom ett samarbete och en fusioner/förvärv är desamma 
inom bioteknik industrin? 
 
Tror du att samma fördelar som i ett nära samarbete kan uppnås i en 
sammanslagning/förvärv? 
 
Hur vanligt tror du det är att företag som haft nära samarbete sedan fusionerar 
eller förvärvar varandra? (Både inom Sverige och över lands gränserna) 
 
Hur påverkas detta av kluster verksamhet? 
 
Hur vanligt tror du att det är att företag som haft ett nära samarbete tidigare 
(exempelvis inom ett kluster) sedan går samman? 
? Varför/Varför inte 
